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Assessing Theories of Global




An effective, legitimate model of global governance must strike a delicate
balance between national sovereignty and international cooperation. As such,
governance on an international level is a constantly evolving discourse among
multiple actors whose respective roles and influence vary across time and
policy realms. The participation of multiple actors in global governance is
widely recognized, but there is considerable disagreement as to the appropriate
distribution of power among these participants and the optimal pattern for their
interaction. We may never be able to construct an ideal global governance
model. But the attempt to create such a model by examining the current needs
of individual nations and the international community in key areas, such as
global antitrust regulation, plays a critical role in promoting sound public
policy.
Antitrust law is illustrative of the legal realms in which conflicting ideas of
international and national regulatory frameworks have yet to find a satisfactory
equilibrium. While competition among multinational enterprises has
increasingly disregarded national borders, antitrust laws have remained
predominantly national. The traditional, though perhaps most controversial,
way to deal with international antitrust issues is to rely on a unilateral
application of national antitrust laws. This type of extraterritoriality, however,
has caused significant tension and resistance.' A more radical, equally
controversial approach would be to harmonize national antitrust laws or
establish unified supranational antitrust rules. This is a far-reaching solution
that lacks adequate support in today's political climate. 2 Other alternative
* LL.M., Harvard Law School, 2002; Licentiate in Laws, University of Helsinki, 2001; Master of
Laws, University of Helsinki, 2000. 1 am grateful to my supervisor, Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, for
her criticism, encouragement, and inspiration during the writing process.
I Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, and Sideways, 75
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1781, 1803 (2000) [hereinafter Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism].
2 See Joel 1. Klein, Time For A Global Competition Initiative?, Address at the E.C. Merger Control
10th Anniversary Conference in Brussels (Sept. 14, 2000), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
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routes to solving existing frictions would be, for example, to expand bilateral
and regional cooperative arrangements or to establish a choice of law system.
Consequently, there is an ongoing debate over whether there is a need to
create an international antitrust regime that could better respond to the new
economic environment, increased cross-border business activity, and the
integration of markets. Proponents of such a regime view international
antitrust rules as necessary tools to reduce transaction costs, increase
efficiency, and cultivate legal certainty. However, there is little agreement
concerning the form, substance, or timeframe of the proposed regulatory
reform. Those who oppose the creation of an international antitrust regime
emphasize the divergent policy goals of different nations and the conflicting
understandings of the role and extent of antitrust enforcement in different
jurisdictions. They argue that discrete policy and enforcement concerns clearly
hinder attempts at internationalization and highlight the necessity of
maintaining regulatory diversity. In this view, countries should retain
regulatory powers on the national level, as part of the exclusive right of
sovereign states to design their market structures and economic policies.
This Article adopts a critical stance within the ongoing debate by applying
different theories of global governance to antitrust law at the international
level. My analysis will encompass three proposed forms of global governance:
intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and transnational models.3  The
intergovernmental model consists of states, represented by their heads of
government, cooperating and bargaining within international regimes. In the
antitrust realm, this would be the model of governance used to reach an
international agreement on antitrust law and incorporate it into an institutional
framework, such as the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). In the
transgovernmental model, lower-level government officials interact directly
with one another, forming transgovernmental networks. When the
transgovernmental governance model is applied in the antitrust sphere, the
focus is on the substate level, with an emphasis on direct cooperation among
national antitrust agencies. Finally, the transnational model highlights the
importance of global nongovernmental organizations and other nonstate actors
in shaping policy preferences and regulatory agendas. In this context, the
Article discusses the role corporations and consumer organizations can play in
influencing the construction of an international antitrust regime.
6486.htm [hereinafter Klein, Time for a Global Competition Initiative?]. The United States has opposed
this approach most notably, yet U.S. leaders have more recently recognized that some measures on the
international level are inevitable. Id.
3 Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, Who Governs?, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 287, 287-89 (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001) [hereinafter
Pollack & Shaffer, Who Governs?] (introducing the three distinct models). In addition to the three
models of global governance discussed in this Article, there are other networks that influence global
governance. For example, increased interaction between national judiciaries offers valuable possibilities
for innovation and superior judicial decisionmaking worldwide through the process of cross-fertilization.
Ongoing dialogue enables different courts to transplant ideas and borrow from each other. Also, national
legislators are increasingly cooperative. Parliamentary delegations hold joint meetings where they
exchange ideas and perceptions on issues of common concern. These forms of international governance
are outside the scope of this study, but that is not to say that they lack significance.
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.After reviewing international antitrust law with reference to these three
models, I conclude that none of them alone is sufficient or desirable as a
governance regime. The temptation simply to impose an intergovernmental
model on international antitrust law must be tempered by concerns about
coercion and about legitimate economic, political, and social differences at the
national level. On the other hand, the convergence of antitrust regulation that
is presently occurring through ongoing dialogue among substate actors offers
promise for the transgovernmental governance model. However, no regime
will garner legitimacy without participation from the nonstate actors discussed
in the transnational model. As my analysis of international antitrust law
attempts to demonstrate, any workable global governance regime must
incorporate aspects of all three models to avoid the pitfalls of each.
The Article proceeds in two stages: a theoretical discussion that examines
the different models of global governance, followed by a case study that
applies these models to the field of antitrust law. Part II will expand on the
theoretical models outlined above, concluding that all three operate to varying
degrees of success in the context of global governance, often coexisting in
larger mixed networks. I also address the challenges supranational rulemaking
imposes on democracy and discuss the specter of regulatory imperialism that
haunts any global governance regime, whatever its structure. Part III addresses
global antitrust law directly, looking at its historical development, adopted
structures, and systemic problems. Following this, I examine the different
governance theories as applied to antitrust, and determine that only a
combination of all three will suffice to bring about the benefits of a global
regime while addressing its costs.
Accordingly, Part IV examines intergovernmental cooperation and the
feasibility of establishing a multilateral antitrust agreement within an
international institution. Part V turns towards the transgovernmental model of
governance, focusing on bilateral cooperation agreements, including an
evaluation of the ability of the national antitrust agency networks to achieve
greater convergence and to mitigate existing frictions. Part VI will address the
prospect of integrating nonstate actors, such as corporations and consumer
organizations, into a framework for designing an international antitrust regime.
Part VII will pull all of these discussions together by outlining the
implications for the development of a potential international antitrust regime
that can be drawn from the governance perspective. Finally, Part VIII
concludes the article by returning to the discussion of global governance
generally, and offering closing remarks on the implications that the antitrust
case study may bear for international governance in general.
II. DIFFERENT MODELS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
This Part explores intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and transnational
models as proposed forms of international governance. As discussed above,
the intergovernmental model consists of states, represented by their heads of
government, cooperating and bargaining within international regimes. In the
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transgovernmental model, lower-level government officials interact directly
with one another, forming networks that span national boundaries. In the
transnational model, the focus is on global civil society and the role of
nongovernmental actors participating directly in governance.
A. Intergovernmental Model of Global Governance
In the intergovernmental model of global governance, the primary actors
are states, and coordination takes place through multilateral agreements and
organizations. 4 Heads of government, foreign ministers, and diplomats from
different nations interact, defending and promoting the interests of their
respective states. Government representatives face the dilemma of balancing
national interests with international obligations that potentially conflict with
the national interests in the short term, but that are believed to advance them in
the long term. 5 In this scenario, nations are left with the difficult task of
complying with international obligations without compromising national
sovereignty.
Heads of state operating within the intergovernmental model of global
governance must also decide whether to incorporate the preferences of their
domestic electorate, which may or may not coincide with their perception of
the national interest, and set their goals and negotiation strategies accordingly.
Thus, according to Robert Putnam's "two-level games" model, international
negotiations take place simultaneously on international and domestic levels. 6
Government representatives negotiate with their foreign counterparts at the
international level in order to reach a mutually advantageous outcome.
Concurrently, negotiators engage in a bargaining process with their domestic
constituencies, with the goal of securing domestic acceptance of the
internationally negotiated agreements. 7
4 Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the
Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1014, 1021, 1038 (1996-97) [hereinafter
Picciotto, Networks].
5 Daniel W. Drezner, On the Balance between International Law and Democratic Sovereignty, 2
CHI. J. INT'L L. 321, 321-23 (2001).
6 See Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, Transatlantic Governance in Historical and
Theoretical Perspective, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3, 21 (Mark A.
Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001) [hereinafter Pollack & Shaffer, Historical and Theoretical
Perspective].
7 See id. Putnam's model combines the domestic and international negotiation processes within a
single framework. However, his model of bargaining does not necessarily reflect the balance of
preferences of different national constituencies. Government negotiators sometimes manipulate the
preferences of governmental subunits and domestic interest groups. Statesmen may, for instance, be
more eager than their domestic constituencies to reach an agreement at the international level. Id. at
21-24. The New Transatlantic Agenda, a joint action plan signed between the European Union and the
United States in 1995, serves as an illustrating example. See The New Transatlantic Agenda,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal-relations/us/new-transatlantic-agenda/text.htm (last visited Apr. 28,
2003); see also Karel Van Miert, Address at the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium (Nov. 26,
1996), http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1996 060 en.html. The Clinton adminis-
tration and the European Commission were arguably more committed to transatlantic economic
liberalization in comparison with the majority of their domestic electorate in the European Union and the
United States. See Pollack & Shaffer, Historical and Theoretical Perspective, supra note 6, at 23.
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1. The Process ofBargaining: Defending National Interests
In the course of intergovernmental negotiations, heads of state frequently
tie together various policy issues when trying to secure domestic acceptance of
policy proposals. 8  An unpopular policy reform proposal relevant to a
particular sector can be linked with popular policy reforms in other sectors in a
sort of international package deal. Such linkages help secure domestic support
for the otherwise unpopular policy reforms. 9  The negotiated package,
embracing several policy realms, often reflects a compromise between various
opposing interests and preferences of different states.
However, rather than reflecting some commonly defined supranational
interests, the compromise often reflects merely the relative bargaining power
of the participating nations. The negotiations do not focus on an ideal solution
for the world at large, as representatives of the states often fail to look beyond
national gains. The result also does not reflect the true compromise of interests
within a policy realm, but rather the balance of bargaining power across a
range of different policy areas. The competing interests between policy realms
are used as tools, trade-offs, and linkages to arrive at an acceptable political
equilibrium. Thus, politics does not only enter into policy, it also dictates the
content of the policy and determines its outcome.
2. Interdependence between Different Policy Realms
Despite the manipulative use of issue linkages, these "international
package deals" contribute to the superiority of international institutions as
forums to negotiate compromises on a wide range of policies. One reason for
this is the existence of important interdependencies between different policy
realms . Antitrust policy, for example, interacts in a complex manner with
industrial, trade, environmental, and other policies. A forum with a mandate to
deal with all of these divergent, yet interdependent, policy areas has the
capacity to consider those interactions and adopt policies which do not
counteract or frustrate the measures taken with respect to other policy areas.
Seeing such interlinkages and being able to address them jointly enables
policymakers to efficiently, coherently, and consistently achieve
interdependence and avoid fragmented policymaking. However, this ideal is
only attainable when the goals of the different policy realms are shaped in light
of their effects on other policy realms, not when the interdependence is seen
only as a bargaining tool to maneuver and coerce negotiators into a political
compromise.
B. Transgovernmental Model of Global Governance
The transgovernmental model of governance questions the exclusive role
of heads of governments in setting regulatory agendas and influencing the
8 Pollack & Shaffer, Historical and Theoretical Perspective, supra note 6, at 22.
9 Id.
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outcome of international policy reforms. The model does not seek to deny the
important role of heads of state in global governance, but emphasizes the
influence of lower-level governmental actors in shaping international policy
outcomes.10 In other words, transgovernmental regulatory networks do not try
to replace traditional actors in the international system. Rather, they seek to
complement the international system by coordinating efforts across borders in
an attempt to define common solutions to problems that all networking states
share. I1
1. The Rise of Transgovernmental Networks
As a consequence of globalization, economic integration, and the
internationalization of formerly domestic policy agendas, it has become
increasingly difficult for states to manage and regulate a complicated,
international, market-driven economic order. As a result, there has been a
general move towards governance by "networks."1 2 The public sector has
been reduced in size and many traditional functions of the state have been
transferred to the private sector. At the same time, management strategies
formerly employed exclusively in the private sector have made their way to
this reconfigured public sphere, as there has been an increasing need to find
effective and less cumbersome ways to govern dynamic markets and
increasingly international economies. The adoption of neo-liberal policy
perspectives has further facilitated the movement away from the traditional
emphasis on the state towards less hierarchical network governance. 13
Government networks offer a new vision of global governance that is
horizontal rather than vertical, and decentralized rather than centralized. This
form of governance is based on the idea of a technocratic, disaggregated state
dominated by subgovernmental experts, rather than by chiefs of government or
civil society. 14 Networks are self-organizing and comprise state and nonstate
actors, ignoring the traditional divisions between public and private sectors. 15
Cooperation among agencies leads to an informal international rulemaking
10 Id. at 25. International financial regulatory organizations such as the Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision (the "Committee") are examples of this model. The Committee consists of
governors of central banks of Switzerland and Luxembourg, in addition to the central bank governors of
the G-10 countries. Even though the Committee is only empowered to make nonbinding
recommendations, those recommendations have in fact been implemented by the participating countries
as well as by some countries whose central banks are not represented in the Committee. See Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW tN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 177,
181-84 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) [hereinafter Slaughter, Governing] (discussing the Basle Committee
and its influence shaping international financial regulation).
II Slaughter, Governing, supra note 10, at 204-05.
12 Pollack & Shaffer, Who Governs?, supra note 3, at 288. Governance by networks can be
distinguished from governance by hierarchies (authoritative commands from governments) or by
markets. When governance is left for markets, the outcomes result from an uncoordinated set of
individual decisions.
13 Picciotto, Networks, supra note 4, at 1038.
14 Pollack & Shaffer, Historical and Theoretical Perspective, supra note 6, at 29.
15 Pollack & Shaffer, Who Governs?, supra note 3, at 288.
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process that engages national officials directly. 16 Heads of governments can
only imperfectly monitor and control the interactions of relatively independent
agencies such as central banks, courts, and regulatory agencies. These actors'
expertise and control of information provide them with a sufficient degree of
autonomy, enabling them to engage in active policymaking.17
Anne-Marie Slaughter has characterized the transgovernmental networks
as forming the "Real New World Order," in which "[t]he state is not
disappearing, it is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts.
These parts-courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures-
are networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of
relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental order." 18 This growth of
international networks has emerged from national regulators' awareness of the
inadequacies of purely domestic regulatory schemes and the recognized need
for internationally coordinated responses.' 9 National regulatory agencies reach
out to their counterparts in other countries in order to cooperatively develop
joint approaches and harmonized policies.20  These networks are a fast,
flexible, and effective way of cooperation among lower-level government
regulators.21 In addition, through transgovernmental networks, national
governments are able to coordinate their responses to common international
problems without ceding their sovereignty to international organizations. 22
The direct collaboration among national administrators has different
objectives. Transgovernmental policy coordination facilitates the smooth
management of cross-border issues and allows states to cooperate effectively
in their policymaking tasks without the bureaucratic procedures of formal
international institutions.23  Transgovernmental interaction also facilitates
coalition building. Subunits of governments can gain support from their like-
16 Slaughter, Governing, supra note 10, at 189.
17 Pollack & Shaffer, Historical and Theoretical Perspective, supra note 6, at 25.
18 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184 (1997)
[hereinafter Slaughter, The Real New World Order].
19 Picciotto, Networks, supra note 4, at 1045.
20 Slaughter, Governing, supra note 10, at 189.
21 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 347, 347 (2001) [hereinafter Slaughter, Accountability]. Slaughter identifies three types of
transgovernmental regulatory networks: (1) networks of national regulators that develop within the
context of already existing international organizations (such as the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD")), (2) networks of national regulators that develop within the
framework of an agreement negotiated by governments (such as the Transatlantic Economic Partnership
agreement of 1998), and (3) networks of national regulators that develop outside of any formal
framework. Networks in the third category have prompted the greatest concern, being most detached
from democratically elected decisionmakers and thus standing apart from more legitimate governance
structures. Id at 355, 359.
22 See Pollack & Shaffer, Who Governs?, supra note 3, at 297-99. Pollack and Shaffer find that
Slaughter's new world order consisting of transgovernmental networks is limited to specific issue areas
such as competition policy. Transgovernmental networks can gain importance in the transatlantic
antitrust domain because of the similarity of regulatory laws and cultures on both sides of the Atlantic, as
well as because of the independence of regulatory authorities. See discussion infra Part V.A.
23 Slaughter, Accountability, supra note 21, at 347.
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minded counterpails abroad, and thereby generate pressure and promote their
cause to their own chiefs of government. 24
2. From Political to Administrative Decisionmaking
The rise of transgovernmental networks has also meant "a shift in
normative power out of the legislative realm into an increasingly complex and
variegated administrative sphere." 25 Today, administrative agencies use power
formerly reserved to democratically accountable political decisionmakers.
Within states, there has been an increasing delegation of regulatory authority
and normative competence from political decisionmakers to professionals and
experts.26  On both the international and domestic levels, administrative
governance has increased because existing institutional capacities cannot deal
with the growing complexity of highly sophisticated policy areas. 27 This
complexity leads to delegation of normative power to independent agencies
that possess the high level of expertise needed to exercise discretion over
intricate policy issues. 28 The power and utility of administrative agencies thus
lie in their expertise and in "their very appearance of objectivity, rationality,
and universality." 29
The growth in administrative policymaking has caused some loss of
government control over policy outcomes. This devolution of power to less
democratic institutions and agents has led to technocratic governance, which
has been seen to depoliticize policymaking, giving rise to some serious
concerns about democratic accountability. 30
3. Internal Dynamics of Networks
Policy coordination can take place among agencies composed of experts
who enjoy significant autonomy within hierarchical government structures.
When the regulatory goals and institutional structures of cooperating agencies
are similar, the policy coordination is more likely to be effective. 31 For
example, the European Union and the United States share similar policy
agendas and preferences over a wide range of issues, which eases the progress
of establishing functioning networks among them.32
24 Pollack & Shaffer, Historical and Theoretical Perspective, supra note 6, at 26.
25 Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of Supra-
nationalism: The Example of the European Community, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 632 (1999).
26 Picciotto, Networks, supra note 4, at 1018.
27 Lindseth, supra note 25, at 632, 634, 688.
28 Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, 17 W. EUR. POL. 77, 89
(1994).
29 See Picciotto, Networks, supra note 4, at 1038.
30 See Pollack & Shaffer, Historical and Theoretical Perspective, supra note 6, at 18. However,
others argue that it is not that political questions have been transformed into technical ones, but merely
that they have been moved into the administrative realm. See Lindseth, supra note 25, at 687.
31 Pollack & Shaffer, Who Governs?, supra note 3, at 303.
32 Id. at 292.
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Participation in transgovernmental networks arguably leads to a redefining
of national interests. As a result of continuous interaction, national agencies
become increasingly bound to a common enterprise and commonly defined
goals. This may cause them to shift from their purely domestic preferences
when trying to define goals in the international arena. Regulators may thus
gradually become advocates of these shared agendas, rather than of a narrowly
defined national interest.
Alvin Gouldner has researched the changes in the incentive structure of
regulators operating in a transnational network. 33  He has distinguished
between two types of regulators: "cosmopolitans" and "locals."
Cosmopolitans tend to embrace an "international reference-group orientation,"
whereas locals are likely to have a "national or subnational reference-group
orientation." 34 Similar conclusions about the internal dynamics of networks
have been reached in recent game-theory work on the role of reputation in
repeated transactions. 35  These theories start from the observation that
cooperation can lead to credible commitments. Cooperating members are
subject to peer pressure and are conscious that pride and self-respect are
endangered by the breaking of commitments. Thus, in the context of the
present discussion, rather than seeing itself as a part of a national bureaucracy
advancing local interests in the international arena, the cooperating agency
recognizes its role as a part of the transnational network pursuing similar
objectives with foreign counterparts. The leaders of these agencies have a
strong interest in the upkeep of their reputations among the other members of
their network, as the prospect of future cooperative endeavors increases the
commitment to the commonly defined goals and raises the level of compliance.
Consequently, transnational networks facilitate the development of
behavioral standards by creating shared expectations. The social mechanisms
of reputational enforcement guarantee the accomplishment of these mutual
expectations. 36 The dynamics of an international network may thus encourage
the transformation of national regulators from "locals" to "cosmopolitans." 37
33 Giandomenico Majone, International Regulatory Cooperation: A Neo-Institutionalist Approach,
in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION 136, 138 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000)
[hereinafter Majone, International Regulatory Cooperation].
34 Id.
35 Id. (citing JOHN MILGROM & PAUL ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
138-143(1992)).
36 Id. at 138-39.
37 Drawing on the European experience, Lindseth speaks about the same phenomenon as
"community capture," referring to the shift in loyalties on the part of national regulators sitting on the
committees at the European Community level. They move slowly from the advocates of national
interests to the "representatives of a Europeanized inter-administrative discourse." Lindseth, supra note
25, at 690 (quoting Christian Joerges & J. Neyer, From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative
Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology, 3 EUR. L.J. 273, 291 (1997)). However,
contrary to the above, it has been claimed that the European Commission, for example, is highly sensitive
to member states' concerns and responsive to their preferences. See Lindseth, supra note 25, at 635.
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4. Benefits of Transgovernmental vis-i-vis Intergovernmental Networks
Transgovernmental networks often prove to be the most efficient means of
global governance for various reasons. Insofar as transgovernmental actors
may deemphasize national interests in relation to policy goals within their area
of expertise, they may be insulated from a purely national bias. Furthermore,
transgovernmental networks exercise "soft power," which emphasizes
cooperation and persuasion rather than coercion and facilitates voluntary
convergence. 38 The voluntary nature of this regulatory cooperation makes
reaching international compromises easier by minimizing the implications for
national sovereignty. Cooperative government networks also serve to avoid
the bureaucratic formality and universality of international organizations. 39
Nonetheless, the strength of the transgovernmental networks depends on their
internal cohesion, existence of mutual trust, good faith, and ability to reach
consensus, as well as on their ability to define common goals. In addition,
while transgovernmental networks are noted for their efficiency and expertise,
they face the challenge of exercising this influence within "a framework that is
accountable and responsive." 40
Transgovernmental networks are not a substitute for the intergovernmental
model of global governance, and the networks are unlikely to replace
international institutions. Networks can indeed excel where institutions fail,
but the demonstrated success of international organizations across many fields
speaks for their valuable role in international policymaking. Nonetheless, an
effective international regime does not require a high level of
institutionalization, and institutions themselves do not guarantee the
effectiveness of the regime.41 In summary, networks are sometimes more apt
at governing global economic order than more formal institutional structures,
and sometimes institutions have overriding benefits. Rather than being a
feasible alternative to international organizations, governmental networks need
to coexist and interact with institutions and complement their role in the
overall governance regime.
C. Transnational Model of Global Governance
Transnational governance emphasizes active participation by nonstate
actors in policy deliberation and global governance. 42 While transnational
dialogues do not constitute an alternative to national governments, but exist in
38 Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence in the Information Age, 77
FOREIGN AFF. 81, 86 (1988) (defining "soft power").
39 Slaughter, Governing, supra note 10, at 199.
40 Sol Picciotto, North Atlantic Cooperation and Democratizing Globalism, in TRANSATLANTIC
REGULATORY COOPERATION 495, 506 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Picciotto, North
Atlantic Cooperation].
41 See Majone, International Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 33, at 136.
42 Kenneth W. Abbott, "Economic" Issues and Political Participation: The Evolving Boundaries of
International Federalism, 18 CARDOzO L. REv. 971, 996-97 (1996).
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partnership with those governments, 43 the increasing role of civil society in
global governance has strengthened the potential of this model. A U.N. report
has recognized that "the activity of non-state actors has today become an
essential dimension of public life at all levels and in all parts of the world."44
Accordingly, international politics has recently witnessed a "participatory
revolution" as nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"), other substate actors,
and individuals have established a presence in international governance. 45
This is a parallel development to what has taken place on domestic levels,
where democratic liberalism has arisen in response to frustration felt towards
the conventional models of governance.46 Young people have increasingly
turned their backs on party politics and other traditional democratic means to
advance their ideological and political objectives. Instead, they have opted
more often to channel their political activity through issue-specific NGOs. To
many young activists, traditional democratic channels represent stagnated old-
world structures, corrupted party politics and failed promises. The rise of
issue-specific NGOs can also be seen as the result of an increasing gulf
between the public sphere and political life. Issue-oriented NGOs are ideal
domains for direct and efficient outcomes, compared to traditional state actors,
in that their focused concentration enables them to have a clear vision,
graspable target, and more straightforward strategies of action. However, they
can also lead to an overly narrow understanding of the complicated, multi-
faceted political reality and to the neglect of other, strongly interconnected
policy concerns.
Transnational actors face the challenge of successfully promoting their
causes by changing the policy preferences of individual states. Much depends
on their financial and human resources, and on their ability to best frame the
issues to effectively influence public opinion, shape agendas, and change the
behavior of states and international organizations. A significant shortcoming
of functioning transnational networks stems from the unequal distribution of
resources among civil society groups. 47 For example, business groups are
traditionally equipped with superior resources compared to labor, consumer,
and environmental groups, enabling them to gain access to a higher level of the
governance process. Additionally, civil society groups in the European Union
and the United States are better organized and possess greater resources than
analogous groups elsewhere.48 Furthermore, although there are functioning
dialogues between interest groups participating in the governance process, the
43 Pollack & Shaffer, Who Governs?, supra note 3, at 299.
44 General Review of Arrangements for Consultations with Non-Governmental Organizations:
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess. at 3, U.N. Doc. E/AC.70 (1994).
45 See generally Kal Raustiala, The 'Participatory Revolution 'in International Environmental Law,
21 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 537 (1997) (describing how NGOs have been incorporated into international
law).
46 Abbott, supra note 42, at 996.
47 Kenneth Abbott divides substate actors into three groups: (1) traditional interest groups such as
labor and business organizations, (2) scientific and technical groups, and (3) issue-oriented groups such
as environmental NGOs. Id. at 996-97.
48 Pollack & Shaffer, Who Governs?, supra note 3, at 292.
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dialogues are segmented by sector, and there is no "dialogue among the
dialogues." 49 Business representatives do not meet with consumer, labor, and
environmental groups in the same public sphere to discuss common agendas.50
The involvement of NGOs in the policymaking process contributes to a
more inclusive governance process. The engagement of civil society in the
international political process helps to assure public support for international
agreements, and facilitates implementation of the agreements in domestic
society.51 However, although NGOs are often touted as the "voice of the
public," many doubt that they are truly representative in nature.52
Transnational governance, with the participation of nonstate actors in an
international regulatory agenda, holds great promise for facilitating
transparency, openness, and democracy in global governance. However, it is a
mistake to assume that increased NGO involvement will necessarily lead to a
superior social outcome. It is not clear that NGOs reflect the preferences of
society, nor that they provide a representative perspective on complex, multi-
faceted policy domains. 53 In order to be an effective force, NGOs must
actively engage in dialogue not only with their members and stakeholders,5 4
but also with other participants in global governance, including government
representatives, corporations, interest groups, and other NGOs.
D. The Existence of Mixed Networks
Recent research shows that, in the transatlantic sphere, the
intergovernmental model continues to be predominant. Transgovernmental
networks have emerged in certain policy realms (such as competition policy),
but remain insignificant in others.55 Additionally, transnational networks have
assumed a vital role but have not managed to take on the role predicted by
more optimistic advocates of a global civil society. 56 The result is a complex
49 Francesca Bignami & Steve Chamovitz, Transatlantic Civil Society Dialogues, in
TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 255, 259 (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C.
Shaffer eds., 2000).
50 Pollack & Shaffer, Who Governs?, supra note 3, at 303-04.
51 Abbott, supra note 42, at 1008.
52 See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 45, at 567 ("The representative character of NGOs has not,
however, been established empirically; indeed, many powerful NGOs come from a small minority of
advanced industrial states, and NGO views are often far from reflective of the public at large."); see also
Slaughter, Governing, supra note 10, at 196.
53 Abbott, supra note 42, at 1009.
54 Picciotto, North Atlantic Cooperation, supra note 40, at 516.
55 Pollack and Schaffer argue that governance based on transgovernmental networks is limited to
policy areas in which regulators enjoy significant independence from political decisionmakers and in
which regulatory approaches are similar, whereas the intergovernmental model of governance remains
predominant when these preconditions are not present. Pollack & Shaffer, Who Governs?, supra note 3,
at 298-99. For example, disputes over genetically modified food and beef hormones provide examples
of regulatory conflicts that are managed through interstate litigation rather than through
transgovemmental networks.
56 Id. at 293. Cf KEN CONCA & RONNIE LIPSCHUTZ, THE STATE AND SOCIAL POWER IN GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (1993) (arguing that a common environmental fate among sovereign states,
with which traditional authority finds itself increasingly unable to deal effectively, will lead to an upsurge
in the political involvement of grass-roots and other nongovernmental groups); PAUL K. WAPNER,
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interaction and interdependence between all three forms of governance--a web
of mixed networks, which by some accounts has become the dominant form of
governance. 57
Mixed networks exist beyond the transatlantic sphere, characterizing
global governance more generally. However, no single global governance
model embracing all policy spheres exists. There are significant differences in
governance structures, cultures, and traditions across nations and policy
domains. Consequently, the relative weight of intergovernmental,
transgovernmental, and transnational actors in the mixed model of network
governance depends on the policy realm and geographic region under
consideration. Furthermore, the comparative importance of each of these
actors depends to a significant extent on the relative power and influence of the
actor within each network. Those possessing fewer resources exist on the
margins of governance, whereas those with significant resources have more
influence over policy outcomes. 58
E. A Note on Democracy and Global Governance
Supranational institutions are not self-legitimating. They continue to
derive their legitimacy from the constitutional structures of the institutions'
member states. All supranational bodies face a similar dilemma: how to
balance the legitimate prerogatives of the organization's sovereign member
states with the broader interest of the overall membership, 59 and how to
achieve the benefits of international cooperation without sacrificing legitimate
concerns over democracy. To a greater or lesser extent, these concerns inform
an understanding of each of the governance regimes discussed in this Article.
Accordingly, before moving on, it is appropriate to address them briefly.
1. Democratic Deficit
Government networks can depoliticize issues by removing them from a
domestic political forum to a technocratic sphere. 60 The networks of agencies
exercise unchecked administrative discretion, which extends beyond political
or legal control. 61 Democratic deficit occurs when legitimate, politically
accountable decisionmakers are replaced by technocratic, unresponsive
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM AND WORLD CIVIC POLITICS (1996) (discussing the expansion of influence
of environmental groups beyond their traditional lobbying of sovereign states to participation in global
civil society); Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil
Society, 21 MILLENNIUM 389, 391 (1992) (discussing the emergence of transnational political networks
while observing that nation-states are likely to be around for some time to come); Christopher Schreuer,
The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L.
447, 451 (1993) (stating that there have been numerous regional and global organizations created over the
last few decades, but that their presence alone does not necessarily mean that any significant changes
have taken place to the structure of the international system).
57 Pollack & Shaffer, Who Governs?, supra note 3, at 301.
58 Id.
59 Lindseth, supra note 25, at 735, 737.
60 Slaughter, Accountability, supra note 21, at 363.
61 Lindseth, supra note 25, at 714.
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administrative agencies without any direct accountability to the people, thereby
shifting decisionmaking processes away from democratic governance. 62
Democratic deficit is a growing concern in most supranational institutions.
Principles of market and principles of democracy seem to be clashing. 63 Our
enormous mission is to let globalization proceed; at the same time, we need to
incorporate democratic values into decisionmaking. We ought to do this by
creating monitoring mechanisms and guaranteeing transparency in
supranational decisionmaking. Instead of focusing our attention on whether
the administrative agencies operate under explicit accountability mandates, we
should ask whether their decisions are made in the context of well-informed
discourse embracing as broad a representation of the public as possible. 64
What is needed is a deepening of open governance. Transparent, open,
inclusive governance includes access to documents and the opportunity to
monitor and criticize decisionmaking and to participate in a dialogue. In
essence, global governance ought to be participatory and sensitive to public
opinion and concerns of the world as a whole. At its best, convergence is
achieved as a result of a lively dialogue among all interested parties leading to
the adoption of policies that reflect a wide array of preferences. The optimal
model of governance should thus be representative, embracing the concerns of
the powerful and powerless alike.
Democratic checks on administrative decisionmaking also should not be
overlooked in constructing a global governance model for antitrust laws.
Legitimacy crises could well threaten achievements in increased convergence
and cooperation and weaken the credibility of an international antitrust regime.
If the process of regulatory cooperation among antitrust agencies is geared
towards more transparent, inclusive, and participatory decisionmaking among
agencies, the legitimacy of the decisionmaking is enhanced and accountability
concerns decrease. 65 The direct engagement of civil society in international
antitrust policymaking would also have the potential to alleviate apprehensions
and furnish a regulatory process with desired elements of legitimacy.
2. Regulatory Imperialism
Some commentators argue that international law is increasingly employed
to circumvent sovereignty.66 This criticism applies to transgovernmental as
well as intergovernmental policymaking. Critics of government networks
allege that international networks serve as devices for the most powerful
countries to impose their policy preferences on less powerful states.67 The
62 Slaughter, Governing, supra note 10, at 193.
63 Ludger Kfihnhardt, Globalization, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation, and Democractic
Values, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION 481,484 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000).
64 Picciotto, North Atlantic Cooperation, supra note 40, at 515.
65 Robert Howse, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and the Problem of Democracy, in
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION 469, 471 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000).
66 See, e.g., Drezner, supra note 5, at 323.
67 See, e.g., Pollack & Shaffer, Who Governs?, supra note 3, at 295 (arguing that the New
Transatlantic Agenda "can be read as an effort by the [Clinton] administration and the [European]
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notion of regulatory imperialism suggests that powerful parties like the
European Union and United States have managed to institutionalize their joint
preferences and incorporate their concerns within the international trading
system by means of their relative power advantage. 68 The expertise and
superior resources of U.S. government institutions, for example, enable them
to exercise influence over less powerful government agencies. 69
Slaughter points out that the informality, flexibility, and lack of coercion
of government networks, however, prevent powerful states from imposing their
will on others. 70 The success of the networks, she argues, is based on
engagement and persuasion and on the establishment of mutual trust among the
participants, not on power and coercion. 71  This analysis is correct to
emphasize the lack of coercive elements and the inability of the networks to
formally bind less powerful states to the policies and practices of more
powerful states. However, if one believes that "soft law," persuasion, and
voluntary convergence have palpable impact, one has to take the concerns over
regulatory imperialism seriously. Even if we understand transgovernmental
networks merely as loosely cooperating agencies exchanging information and
developing best practices, issues of regulatory imperialism remain.
Information flow, which is more likely to proceed from the agencies of
developed countries to the agencies of developing countries, creates a notable
asymmetry and raises the question of external accountability of one nation to
another. 72
Despite the dangers explored above, the connotation of the term
''regulatory imperialism" overstates the negative aspects of international
regulatory cooperation and overlooks the positive features of regulatory
reform, such as the ability and willingness of more powerful nations to aid less
powerful nations and provide desperately needed expert assistance. However,
while it is in the interest of all nations to create stable and efficient regulatory
regimes all over the world, this is not always achieved by imposing the
systems of powerful states on less powerful ones. The apprehensions of
Commission to institutionalize their joint preference for the ongoing liberalization of transatlantic and
global trade and investment."); see also Drezner, supra note 5, at 323 (alleging that "the United States
and European Union employ diplomatic, economic, and other forms of coercion to codify their
preferences in international law."). Additionally, transgovernmental networks could be argued to favor
the powerful countries at the expense of the less powerful ones even more so than international
organizations, as transgovemmental networks do not provide any framework within which all countries
would have equal voting rights as some of the international institutions do.
68 Pollack & Shaffer, Who Governs?, supra note 3, at 295. The idea of regulatory imperialism and
the view that international cooperation only reflects power relations correspond to realist theories on
international relations. Drezner goes further by saying that the European Union and the United States use
coercion to codify their preferences in international law, using "forum-shopping" among different
governmental organizations to advance their interests by pushing international law to desired ends. The
strategy employed first involves an agreement among a coalition of the willing, followed by enticing the
resisting sovereign states to agree. Drezner admits, however, that the advance of international law by the
means described above has occasionally helped to preserve democratic sovereignty from antidemocratic
impulses. See Drezner, supra note 5, at 323, 329, 332.
69 Slaughter, Governing, supra note 10, at 205.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Slaughter, Accountability, supra note 21, at 364-65.
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developing countries cannot be disregarded, and a high level of sensitivity has
to be exercised when imposing regulatory models on them.
Ii. ANTITRUST LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Antitrust laws shape the market order and define how much power large
firms should have in society and how actively the state should be involved in
regulating economic actors. This task has become increasingly difficult in the
wake of globalization and the integration of markets. The inability of national
antitrust regimes to adequately control the increasingly international market
conduct of multinational enterprises has been widely recognized.73
There is a growing consensus that antitrust laws have to be reassessed
given the new, dynamic, and often borderless economic environment that they
are meant to regulate. To seek an appropriate framework for antitrust law in
the era of global markets is to attempt to lay out a vision of the roles and
relationships among individuals, enterprises, and governments in the world
economy.74 The optimal antitrust regime for the integrated economy should
produce a sound regulatory framework for multinational corporations. It
should also provide antitrust authorities across jurisdictions with adequate and
effective devices to control the market power and conduct of corporations.
Lastly, and most importantly, the international antitrust scheme should
promote greater global economic efficiency and prosperity for the benefit of
consumers throughout the world.
Considerably less consensus, however, has emerged with respect to how
this reassessment of national antitrust laws ought to be accomplished. 75
Consequently, the ideal vision of a global antitrust policy--one that assures the
competitiveness of global markets and the maximization of global welfare-is
subject to intense dispute.76
73 See discussion infra Part Il.1B; Sir Leon Brittain, The Need for Multilateral Framework of
Competition Rules, in TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICIES, EXPLORING THE WAYS FORWARD / OECD 29
(1999) (discussing how the interaction between competition policy and trade can be best addressed in a
global economy); Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism, supra note I (analyzing regulatory
federalism and regulatory competition with respect to competition law); Andrew T. Guzman, Is
International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1501 (1998) [hereinafter Guzman, Is International
Antitrust Possible?] (analyzing the economic incentives facing countries when selecting an antitrust
policy).
74 See Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Lessons
from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 557, 604 (1994) ("Competition policy broadly construed is the juris-
prudence of capitalism, and it speaks to a society's view of the role and the relationship of the individual,
the enterprise and the government in a pluralistic society and economy.").
75 See Brian Portnoy, Constructing Competition: Antitrust and the Political Foundations of Global
Capitalism 35 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with the University
of Chicago).
76 For example, the European Union and the United States, possessing the most extensive and
elaborate antitrust regimes in the world, disagree to a significant extent about the appropriate treatment of
antitrust law at the international level. The European Union has urged for negotiations to be held on an
international competition policy agreement that establishes minimum standards for competition policy
and enforcement. The agreement, according to the European Union, should be grounded in the WTO
framework. The United States has been reluctant to agree to the idea of an international antitrust regime
and prefers regulatory cooperation based on bilateral agreements between national and regional antitrust
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Whatever the embodied goals of a global antitrust policy might be,
however, it is evident that the existing, suboptimal antitrust policy hinders the
functioning of global markets and the competition-based economy. The lack of
adequate international convergence and cooperation not only inhibits the
activities of multinational corporations and national antitrust authorities, but
also deprives consumers throughout the world of the full benefits of open trade
and protection that efficient antitrust laws would provide.
Below, I explore alternative ways to govern antitrust law in the new global
era. The focus of the inquiry will be on the three models of global governance
discussed above (intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and transnational) as
they apply to the antitrust sphere. Before entering into a discussion on the
advantages and disadvantages of each model, I will briefly lay out the
background against which the internationalization of antitrust must be
discussed, namely (1) the differences in national antitrust laws, (2) the reasons
to seek convergence and cooperation, and (3) the history of antitrust
cooperation at the international level to date.
A. Differences in National Antitrust Regimes
Currently, approximately eighty to one hundred countries have established
national antitrust regimes, and more than half of these regimes were adopted in
the last decade. 77 These countries have designed their antitrust policies to
serve a variety of goals that differ markedly from country to country. In the
United States, for example, the primary goal of antitrust laws is to encourage
the efficient functioning of competitive markets and maximize consumer
welfare, whereas Canadian antitrust laws view the promotion of small and
medium-sized enterprises as being at least as important.78 The European
Union takes a view on antitrust that goes beyond efficiency concerns to include
consideration of distributional effects, fairness, and broader goals of market
integration. Some view Japan's antitrust laws as designed to promote
significant industrial policy goals, which is demonstrated by its lenient
treatment of certain cartel arrangements. 79
However, the diverse goals that countries pursue through antitrust laws
have in some ways converged in recent years.80 This convergence is mostly
due to growing economic integration, which has created a need for national
authorities. See, e.g., Joel I. Klein, A Reality Check on Anti-trust Rules in the World Trade Organization
and a Practical Way Forward on International Anti-trust, in TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICIES,
EXPLORING WAYS FORWARD 41, 41-42 (1999) [hereinafter Klein, A Reality Check].
77 U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div., INT'L COMPETITION ADVISORY COMM. TO THE ATr'Y
GENERAL AND ASSISTANT ATr'Y GENERAL FOR ANTITRUST, FINAL REPORT 33 (2000) [hereinafter
ICPAC REPORT] (stating that there are 80 countries with antitrust regimes). However, some of the most
recent estimates indicate that there are between 90 and 100 jurisdictions that have adopted antitrust laws.
See Konrad von Finckenstein, Recent Developments in the International Competition Network, Address
at the Forum on International Competition Law (Feb. 6, 2003), available at http://www international
competitionnetwork.org/speech-aba.html.
78 Guzman, Is InternationalAntitrust Possible?, supra note 73, at 1539.
79 Julian Epstein, The Other Side of Harmony: Can Trade and Competition Laws Work Together in
the International Marketplace?, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 343, 358-59 (2002).
80 Id. at 359.
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antitrust authorities to cooperate and exchange views on common antitrust
concerns. Increased contacts and communication have lead to a cross-
fertilization of ideas and the gradual development of a common approach to
certain issues. By now, there is widespread consensus among nations
regarding the anticompetitive nature of certain types of conduct. A consensus
at some level could be reached, for example, with respect to how to treat price
fixing, market division, and bid rigging. 81 However, outside this relatively
limited realm there remain areas of divergence of national antitrust laws that
continue to cause friction. 82
The differences between domestic antitrust regimes have the potential to
contribute to "system friction."83 In other words, one country's antitrust laws
may facilitate conduct that another country's laws prohibit. In the domain of
antitrust, there are no supranational rules for choice of law, jurisdictional
priority, or proportionality to restrict enforcement. As a result, companies are
always subject to the most restrictive jurisdiction. 84
There have been several attempts to achieve greater convergence among
national antitrust regimes and to increase cooperation among national antitrust
authorities. 85  Intensified cooperation among regulators has succeeded in
facilitating enforcement and achieving greater convergence among antitrust
laws. 86 This increased convergence has in turn fostered cooperation, as there
have been fewer disagreements to overcome. Accordingly, cooperation and
convergence are mutually reinforcing. 87
81 Several documents reflect this consensus. For example, see the 1998 OECD Recommendation of
the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, OECD Doc. C(98)35iFinal (1998);
see also Recommendation of the Council for Cooperation between Member Countries in Areas of
Potential Conflict, OECD Doc. C(86)65/Final (1986); Recommendation of the Council on Competition
Policy and Exempted or Regulated Sectors, OECD Doc. C(79)155/Final (1979).
82 Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism, supra note 1, at 1783. Approaches towards mergers,
for example, vary significantly across jurisdictions. Unlike the United States and Germany, the European
Union, Japan, and France, for example, are more concerned with market conduct than market structure.
Regimes also differ in terms of the capital thresholds that trigger a merger review. In addition to
substantial differences in national merger control policies, there are remarkable procedural differences,
such as variant notification procedures. See Portnoy, supra note 75, at 101.
83 Sylvia Ostry, Policy Approaches to System Friction: Convergence Plus, in NATIONAL
DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 333, 333 (Suzanne Berger & Ronald Dore eds., 1996). According
to Ostry, "harmonization of competition policy will be necessary but not sufficient to mitigate system
friction that has emerged from the more intense competition within the Triad (the EC, the United States,
and Japan) in high-tech sectors." Id.
84 Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism, supra note 1, at 1805.
85 For purposes of this discussion, "convergence" refers to increasing similarity in substantive
antitrust standards and domestic policy outcomes, while "cooperation" refers to mutual assistance among
antitrust authorities such as coordination of enforcement, exchange of information, and assistance in
gathering evidence.
86 Report on the Internationalization of Competition Law Rules: Coordination and Convergence,
1999 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. & INT'L L. & PRAC. 37-38, available at http://www.abanet.org/
antitrust/convexe.html (noting that the OECD is the "forerunner of positive comity").
87 Portnoy, supra note 75, at 4.
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B. Reasons for Seeking Increased Cooperation and Convergence
The lack of an international approach to antitrust law poses a number of
problems that can be solved only through increased convergence and
cooperation among national antitrust regimes. First, there is serious concern
that the benefits of trade liberalization can be undermined by the restrictive
business practices of private enterprises. The benefits of successfully
eliminating government barriers to trade can be frustrated when these barriers
are replaced by anticompetitive practices. 88 Consequently, one of the most
compelling reasons for internationalization of antitrust law and policy has been
the need to complement the trade liberalization process. 89
Second, the need for intensified international cooperation is supported by
the existence of international cartels. National antitrust authorities are unable
to effectively investigate and prosecute price-fixing and territorial allocation
that stretch across jurisdictional boundaries. Investigations often require
gathering evidence spread throughout the world that is difficult to obtain
without cooperation among antitrust authorities. 90
Third, one may fear the potential emergence of global oligopolies and
monopolies, which cannot be regulated successfully by national antitrust laws
alone. Once industries consolidate and a global monopoly or oligopoly
develops, it may be too late to invent an efficient remedy. 91
Finally, the existence of duplicative enforcement policies is a critical
argument for increased convergence and international cooperation. Globally
competitive enterprises are subject to divergent antitrust regimes in multiple
jurisdictions. Investigations taking place simultaneously in multiple
jurisdictions burden both businesses and antitrust authorities. Multinational
corporations operating across jurisdictions face cumbersome procedures and
conflicting legal standards with which they need to comply. Inconsistent
procedures cause unnecessary delays, increase transaction costs, and reduce
predictability within the legal environment in which businesses operate. 92 If a
more consistent antitrust framework existed, national antitrust agencies would
also save costs and be able to work more effectively. These agencies would
undoubtedly benefit from coordinated investigations, jointly negotiated
remedies, and various work-sharing arrangements.
In the absence of a coordinated effort, concurrent investigations may lead
to conflicting substantive outcomes. The recent proposed merger between two
88 F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 12, 15-16
(1994).
89 ICPAC REPORT, supra note 77, at 216-18 (outlining a number of industries where private
anticompetitive practices in fact form barriers to market access).
90 Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 478,
479-480 (2000). The prominence of international cartel enforcement is well illustrated in statistics from
the Department of Justice: over ninety percent of criminal fines collected in 1997 and 1998 derived from
international cartel prosecution. See Douglas Melamed, Antitrust Enforcement in the Global Economy,
Address before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 25th Annual Conference on International Antitrust
Law and Policy (Oct. 22, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2043.htm.
91 Tarullo, supra note 90, 479-48 1.
92 Id. at 482.
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U.S. corporations, General Electric Company and Honeywell International
Inc., demonstrated this danger. 93 The merger was approved by the U.S.
antitrust authorities, but blocked by the Commission of the European
Communities ("European Commission"). Even though inconsistent decisions
are rare, their mere possibility creates uncertainty and diminishes the
credibility of the antitrust system in general.
The problems relating to burdensome enforcement measures are especially
noteworthy with respect to conflicting premerger notification schemes. A
rapidly increasing number of countries has adopted premerger screening
procedures. To date, approximately sixty countries have introduced national
merger control regimes and the number of jurisdictions is growing.94 This
growth has increased the costs imposed on transnational mergers that require
clearance in several jurisdictions. For each merger, the kind of information
that must be provided to each antitrust authority often differs, and the waiting
periods during which the authorities analyze the merger vary among the
merger regimes. Laws are not identical and, even when identical, are
interpreted and applied differently. A country whose market is only slightly
affected can delay a complex transaction that has already been successfully
cleared in some twenty or thirty other jurisdictions. 95
The controversies related to extraterritorial application of national antitrust
laws have further encouraged countries to seek more cooperative and less
conflict-ridden ways to handle cross-border antitrust matters. 96 The unilateral
application of antitrust law is seen as an encroachment on the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of another nation. Finding ways to address collective
problems jointly with other interested parties leads to more acceptable
outcomes and serves the goals of international antitrust enforcement more
aptly.
93 Commission Decision of 3 July 2001 Declaring Concentration to be Incompatible with the
Common Market and the EEA Agreement, General Electric/Honeywell, COMP/M.2220 (2001)
[hereinafter Commission Decision of 3 July 2001 ].
94 ICPAC REPORT, supra note 77, at 33 (stating that at least sixty jurisdictions provide for merger
control regimes). For the list of individual countries with established merger regulation, see Annex 2-C
of the ICPAC Report. Id. annex 2-C.
95 Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism, supra note 1, at 1803. The divergence between
different national merger control laws is more procedural than substantive and should therefore be easier
to overcome. The OECD has attempted to streamline transnational merger regulation by issuing a
"Report of Notification of Transnational Mergers." See Report on Notification of Transnational Mergers,
Committee on Competition Law and Policy, OECD Doc. DAFFE/CLP(99)2/Final (Feb. 23, 1999). The
OECD Recommendation includes a draft "Framework for Notification and Report Form for
Concentrations." Until today, however, not even procedural harmonization has been achieved among
merger regimes.
96 The concept of extraterritoriality has always been a highly controversial issue. See P.M. Roth,
Reasonable Extraterritoriality: Correcting the 'Balance of Interests,' 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 245,
251-52 (1992) (discussing the contradictory nature of extraterritoriality); see also Anu Piilola, Is There
a Need for Multinational Competition Rules?, 10 FIN. Y.B. INT'L L. 263, 276-282 (1999) (discussing the
controversial nature of extraterritoriality and the criticism and retaliatory action in which it has resulted);
Aidan Robertson & Marie Demetriou, 'But That Was in Another Country...': The Extraterritorial
Application of US. Antitrust Laws in the U.S. Supreme Court, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 417, 420
(1994) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's consideration of international comity when deciding
whether to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction).
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C. History of International Cooperation and Convergence Efforts
The 1948 Havana Charter (the "Charter" or the "Havana Charter") was the
first attempt to provide an international framework for regulating
anticompetitive practices. 97 Chapter V of the Charter was the first time an
international agreement attempted to impose an obligation on its contracting
parties to prevent restrictive business practices of private enterprises. 98 The
Charter fell through, however, primarily because of the opposition it faced in
the U.S. Congress. 99
Since the failure of the Havana Charter, there have been subsequent efforts
to address the issue at the international level, but thus far none of the proposals
has led to the creation of a truly international antitrust regime. Discussions on
international aspects of antitrust law have taken place in international
institutions such as the United Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT"), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD"), and, most recently, within the WTO framework.100
Past efforts and the potential of the WTO and the OECD to provide a setting
for future international antitrust issues will be discussed below.
Despite the unsuccessful attempts to establish an international antitrust
regime, cooperation and convergence have gradually proceeded partly within
and partly outside the scope of international institutions. Aggressive
extraterritorial application of domestic antitrust laws characterizing the
postwar era has given way to comity and cooperation among antitrust
authorities.101 Bilateral cooperation agreements have arisen among national
antitrust authorities and have resulted in continuously increasing
convergence. 102
Achieving regional convergence has been more successful than
convergence efforts at the global level. The most extensive convergence can
be found in the European Union. European Community ("E.C.") competition
law is the only example of a far-reaching, supranational antitrust architecture at
the regional level. The E.U. Member States have, to a significant extent, ceded
their sovereignty to this supranational body. The common antitrust regime that
has resulted from this cession of sovereignty can be seen as an essential
component of economic integration and the creation of the single market. 03
97 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, U.N. Conference on Trade &
Development, Final Act and Related Documents, art. 46.1, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78 (1948).
98 Nataliya Yacheistova, The International Competition Regulation: A Short Review of a Long
Evolution, 18 WORLD COMPETITION, L. & ECON. REV. 99, 99-100 (1994).
99 SCHERER, supra note 88, at 89.
100 Ever since the Havana Charter, the United States has held de facto veto power over the creation
of an international antitrust code. The United States remains the main opponent of a multilateral antitrust
regime by opposing the incorporation of antitrust provisions into the WTO framework. See Portnoy,
supra note 75, at 196.
101 Id. at40.
102 See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities regarding the application of their competition laws, June 15,
1995, E.C.-U.S., 1995 O.J. (L 132) [hereinafter E.U.-U.S. Agreement on Competition Law].
103 See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY, 2002 O.J. (C 325).
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Outside the European Union, the most developed regional antitrust agreement
is the one in existence between Australia and New Zealand. This agreement is
built on OECD recommendations1 04 and is part of the Closer Economic
Relations Trade Agreements between the countries. These two countries have
largely harmonized their respective competition laws and even replaced
antidumping duties with antitrust law.105 However, it is important to note that
such a comprehensive agreement has taken place in the context of an extensive
trade agreement between countries with highly similar antitrust laws and legal
cultures. The North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") incorporates
rather modest antitrust provisions, stating that the United States, Canada, and
Mexico should "adopt or maintain measures to proscribe anticompetitive
business conduct and take appropriate action with respect thereto, recognizing
that such measures will enhance the fulfillment of the objectives of this
Agreement." 106 No measures have been taken to establish specific standards or
procedural rules applicable to anticompetitive conduct affecting trade between
NAFTA states. 107
Academic experts have also contributed to the discussion on international
antitrust rules. In 1993, the Munich Group, a group of academic experts and
practitioners, outlined one of the most far-reaching proposals. The proposal
consisted of a model agreement, the Draft International Antitrust Code
("DIAC"), which could be incorporated into the WTO framework.10 8 The
DIAC discusses the minimum standards that would need to be obeyed by
contracting parties and suggests that an international antitrust agency would be
established to safeguard the consistent application of national antitrust
provisions. In the end, this proposal received strong criticism, but succeeded
in stimulating worldwide debate on the need for an increasingly international
approach to antitrust issues. 109
Another group of experts was formed by the European Commission to
analyze alternative ways to internationalize antitrust policy (the "1995 Expert
Group"). 1' 0 The 1995 Expert Group Report, entitled "Competition Policy in
the New Trade Order: Strengthening International Cooperation and Rules,"
concluded that bilateral cooperation should be further extended and
enhanced.I" In addition, this report recommended that a multilateral
framework for antitrust ought to be created to ensure that certain basic
104 See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
105 Portnoy, supra note 73, at 173.
106 NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, ch. 15, § 1501.
107 R.O. Cunningham, & A.J. LaRocca, Harmonization of Competition Policies in a Regional
Economic Integration, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 879, 898-99 (1996).
108 See generally Wolfgang Fikentscher, Competition Rules for Private Agents in the GATT/WTO
System, 1994 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT (analyzing DIAC); Bernard Phillips, Comments on the Draft
InternationalAntitrust Code, 1994 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT (discussing DIAC).
109 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Competition-Oriented Reforms of the WTO World Trade System-
Proposals andPolicy Options, in TOWARDS WTO COMPETITION RULES 43,48 (Roger Zach ed., 1999).
110 See Report of the Group of Experts, Competition Policy in the New Trade Order: Strengthening
International Cooperation and Rules, European Commission, Brussels (1995), http://europa.eu.int/
comm/competition/intemational/srenghen.pdf
111 Petersmann, supra note 109, at 50-53 (outlining the main points of the Expert Group Report).
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competition principles would be respected and incorporated into national
antitrust laws. Implicit in this recommendation is a progressive approach for
attaining its ambitious goals. For example, minimum standards could first be
adopted among a number of developed antitrust regimes. Later, the agreement
could be expanded to include other states and to incorporate broader
substantive rules.11 2
IV. INTERGOVERNMENTAL GOVERNANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST LAW
This Part discusses various institutional contexts in which an agreement on
international antitrust could be negotiated and implemented. The cooperation
and monitoring that would be required pursuant to the signing of the agreement
would likely be rooted in some institutional setting if the coverage of the
agreement were extensive. This intergovernmental agreement could take place
within the framework of an existing international institution or within a new,
independent international antitrust body. A far more unlikely alternative is that
an agreement could be negotiated outside the scope of any institutional
framework.
Institutions often shape the policies they are supposed to implement.
Common antitrust policy could therefore take different forms and yield
divergent results depending on the institutional alternative chosen. The
institutional advantages and disadvantages differ depending on whether one
would incorporate antitrust law and policy into a multi-issue institution or into
an independent, one-issue institution that would exclusively focus on antitrust
matters. An agreement within a multi-issue institution, such as the WTO, for
example, would likely be influenced by the norms and procedures governing
that trading regime.113 The institutional alternatives that have received the
most attention in the context of internationalization of antitrust law are the
WTO, the OECD, and an independent, international antitrust forum.1 14
112 Jean-Francois Pons, International Cooperation in Competition Matters-Where Are We Four
Years after the Van Miert Report?, in TOWARDS WTO COMPETITION RULES 195, 196-97 (Roger Zach
ed. 1999).
113 Tarullo, supra note 90, at 479, 503.
114 The third institution that addresses antitrust concerns is the United Nations through the
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). See UNCTAD website, at http://www.unctad.org.
However, I see the UNCTAD as the least feasible alternative for hosting an international antitrust
agreement and do not analyze its advantages and disadvantages as an institution within the scope of this
study. For the purpose of comparing and contrasting intergovernmental, transgovenmmental, and
transnational models of governance, the WTO and the OECD provide sufficient examples of
institutionalized intergovernmental alternatives.
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A. The Capacity and the Desirability of the WTO to Foster International
Convergence in Antitrust Law
One of the most compelling arguments for the establishment of an
international antitrust agreement is that the restrictive business practices of
private enterprises undermine the gains of trade liberalization that have been
realized through the successful elimination of governmental trade barriers." 1 5
Thus, the potential for anticompetitive conduct to offset the benefits
guaranteed by GATT has stimulated the debate on integrating trade and
antitrust issues through the incorporation of antitrust provisions into the WTO
framework. 116
The WTO is among the most successful of the various international
economic organizations. The accomplishment of the WTO in opening world
markets has drawn more and more issues into the institution's framework,
including antitrust policy.11 7 Even though the WTO can be argued to have the
greatest capacity among existing institutions for hosting an international
antitrust agreement, the inclusion of antitrust within the WTO framework has
been highly controversial. The European Union has urged the commencement
of negotiations on an international antitrust agreement through the WTO. The
proposal of the European Commission requires WTO member states to (1)
enact national antitrust laws that would entail at least core antitrust provisions,
(2) establish an effective enforcement mechanism for substantive antitrust laws
respecting principles of nondiscrimination and transparency, (3) set up
cooperation devices among antitrust authorities, and (4) provide for the gradual
convergence of national practices, 18
Canada has joined the European Union in advocating the adoption of
antitrust issues into the WTO agenda whereas the United States has repeatedly
rejected the initiative.' 19 The United States most worries about the inability to
overcome existing national differences in antitrust regimes.120 The lack of
national antitrust laws in almost half of the WTO countries may also
complicate the establishment of an international antitrust regime. Furthermore,
115 Portnoy, supra note 75, at 217 (outlining a number of industries where private anticompetitive
practices in fact form barriers to market access).
116 See, e.g., TOWARDS WTO COMPETITION RULES (Roger Zach ed., 1999) (discussing key issues
from a 1998 WTO report on trade and competition); Annelle Bongardt, Vertical Interfirm Relations: A
Competition Policy Issues?, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: MODALITIES FOR CO-
OPERATION 307, 338 (Leonard Waverman et al. eds., 1997) (stating that "[clompetition policy is beyond
WTO rulings" and that "the WTO does not encompass every practice through which governments or
industries can protect their home markets"); Phedon Nicolaides, For a World Competition Authority, The
Role of Competition Policy in Economic Integration and the Role of Regional Blocs in Internationalizing
Competition Policy, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 131 (1996) (discussing the question of "whether the WTO is
the right institution to deal with distortions to competition" between countries).
117 Tarullo, supra note 90, at 487-494.
118 Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Communication
from the European Community and Its Member States, WTO Doc. W/WGTCP/W/l 15 (May 25, 1999);
see also Brittain, supra note 73, at 29-31 (discussing the need for a new framework agreement on
competition).
119 Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism, supra note 1, at 1787.
120 Klein, A Reality Check, supra note 76, at 41-42.
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the United States is concerned that negotiations at the international level would
be cumbersome, thereby resulting in a weak, ineffective regime.12' Instead,
the United States promotes a gradual voluntary convergence of antitrust law
and emphasizes the development of a "culture of competition."122
Despite the difference of opinion between the European Union and the
United States, the WTO established the Working Group on Interaction between
Trade and Competition Policy during the 1996 WTO Ministerial Conference in
Singapore to investigate the potential of private restraints to undermine the
benefits of trade liberalization.123 Its tasks are analytical and exploratory, and
its purpose is not to negotiate new rules or commitments.
1. Advantages of Incorporating Antitrust into the WTO Framework
The primary advantages of the WTO over other forums are its universal
membership and its experience in successfully managing the negotiation and
implementation of complex international agreements.124 The fact that many
countries, including the United States, submit major trade agreements to their
legislatures for approval also has the benefit of increasing the legitimacy of the
WTO agreements. 125
Due to the interdependence between antitrust and trade policies, there is a
great need to consider the implications of one policy regime vis-a-vis the other.
The inclusion of antitrust law and policy into the WTO would allow a greater
coordination of the respective policy realms. The WTO would have the ability
to consider the interactions between trade and competition and adopt policies
in one area that do not counteract or frustrate the measures taken in another
area.126 Consequently, the WTO can effectively manage interdependence,
avoid fragmented policymaking, and foster efficiency and consistency in the
trade and antitrust domains.
121 Joel I. Klein, No Monopoly on Antitrust: It Would Be Premature for the WTO to Seek to Enforce
Global Competition Rules, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at 20.
122 The creation of a Global Competition Initiative, proposed by the United States, has been a
recent step taken to explore the furthering of international cooperation in the antitrust field. The purpose
of the Initiative is to establish a forum where those responsible for the development and management of
antitrust policy could discuss issues of common interest. See Klein, Time for a Global Competition
Initiative?, supra note 2 (discussing the need for a "global competition initiative"). The European Union
has given its support to the Initiative, but has emphasized that the forum must be regarded as
complementary to, not as an alternative to, the measures taken on antitrust within the framework of the
WTO. See Mario Monti, Competition Policy and Globalisation, Address Before the American Bar
Association Meeting, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 29, 2001), http://europa.eu/.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh
(enumerating issues that the proposed forum should ideally discuss); see also Alexander Schaub, The
Global Competition Forum: How It Should be Organised and Operated, Address to the European Policy
Centre, Brussels (Mar. 14, 2001), http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp200l_003_en.
pdf (discussing ways to overcome barriers to antitrust enforcement).
123 Ministerial Conference, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(96)/DEC
(Dec. 18, 1996).
124 Andrew Guzman, Antitrust and International Regulatory Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1142,
1157-58 (2001) [hereinafter Guzman, Antitrust and International Regulatory Federalism].
125 See Tarullo, supra note 90, at 488.
126 In addition to the complementarities between trade and competition policies, the WTO would
be in a position to consider, for example, the interface between the protection of intellectual property and
the functioning of free competition.
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The clear benefit of the WTO is its potential to overcome divergent
national incentives created by international trade flows and local regulatory
objectives. 127 The WTO covers multiple issue areas and thus enables states to
negotiate transfer payments in one area to achieve agreement in another. 28
The WTO provides an institutional setting in which a wide range of policy
areas can be linked and concessions discussed. An example of successful
WTO negotiations based on issue linkages and concessions is the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"). Though
they had little to gain from the stricter intellectual property standards
introduced during the Uruguay Round negotiations, developing countries
consented to the TRIPS proposal in exchange for trade concessions from
developed countries. 129 This ability to negotiate across issue areas has been
argued to be a fundamental precondition to the achievement of an agreement
on antitrust at the international level.130
The existence of a dispute settlement system in the WTO also indicates the
superiority of the WTO as a forum for international antitrust. The presence of
procedures to compel countries to honor their commitments can be viewed as
the only way to guarantee compliance with international norms.' 3' However,
the inclusion of dispute resolution in an agreement on international antitrust
law could discourage participation by countries most concerned with ceding
their economic sovereignty to a supranational body of antitrust enforcers.132
2. Disadvantages of Incorporating Antitrust into the WTO Framework
Notwithstanding the clear benefits the WTO possesses as a potential
institution for hosting an international antitrust agreement, there are also
obvious weaknesses. Trade and antitrust domains have somewhat different
and sometimes even conflicting goals that have the potential to hamper their
smooth coordination.133 Trade laws are designed to open markets to exporters,
127 Guzman argues that, unless trade in imperfectly competitive markets remains balanced, the
objectives of net importers and net exporters are inconsistent. Net exporters promote weak antitrust
standards while net importers seek stricter antitrust laws. Guzman, Antitrust and International
Regulatory Federalism, supra note 124, at 1504.
128 Multilateral solutions would bring more benefits to developing countries, which are not capable
of imposing their antitrust laws on others extraterritorially. The United States, therefore, has little to gain
and much to lose if a multilateral agreement is negotiated. See Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism,
supra note 1, at 1807.
129 Guzman, Antitrust and International Regulatory Federalism, supra note 124, at 1157.
130 Id. at 1157-58.
131 Id. at 1158 ("Dispute settlement within the WTO is certainly imperfect, but it is the best
available mechanism for ensuring compliance with a competition agreement.").
132 Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Millennium Round, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 665, 677
(1999) [hereinafter Fox, Competition Law].
133 When vertical restraints, for example, are considered from a trade perspective, the conclusions
regarding the effects of the restraint can be quite different than if they were considered from an antitrust
policy perspective. See ICPAC REPORT, supra note 77, at 210. At the same time, overlapping policy
concerns lead to different conclusions regarding the effects of a particular restraint. For example, U.S.
antitrust law might find a vertical distribution practice efficiency-enhancing and beneficial to consumers,
while a trade policy perspective might find the same practice exclusionary and adversely affecting access
to markets. Id.
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not to optimize the efficiency of the marketplace or the benefits to the
consumer. 134  In addition, the WTO is accustomed to governing rules
constraining government behavior, not regulating private conduct. 35
The WTO also has a rather adversarial character, which makes it
somewhat inappropriate for fostering regulatory cooperation among states.
The cooperative approach distinctive to antitrust policymaking deviates
significantly from the practices familiar to trade negotiations. The traditional
strength of the WTO has been to fashion rules that restrict nations from
pursuing aims that conflict with the interests of other nations. The institution
is designed to set limits on governments' interference with trade flows, not to
help governments address shared regulatory issues. In other words, the virtue
of the organization has been "the elimination of certain government practices,
not their coordination."136 Thus, inclusion of antitrust rules in the WTO
framework would require the institution to "move beyond its traditional area of
advantage."1 37 In addition, the WTO's adversarial tradition could jeopardize
the trust that has been established among national antitrust authorities. This
could result in a diminished willingness to share information or assist in
investigations on matters outside the scope of the WTO.138
As there is no interpretive authority in the WTO, agreements must often
entail rules that are precisely specified in order to enhance legal certainty.' 39
Antitrust law, however, follows the trends and discoveries in economic
learning and must be able to change with new market conditions.140 Freezing
antitrust analysis into exact standards would reduce the flexibility needed for
effective, case-specific interpretation of antitrust rules and principles. Any
need to subsequently modify the negotiated rules would be a cumbersome and
slow process. Therefore, negotiating a binding set of accurate international
antitrust principles and agreeing on precisely defined common standards from
the outset could be counterproductive. On the other hand, conflicting views on
the appropriate content of the antitrust agreement could also encourage the
adoption of imprecise, general provisions with vaguely defined exemptions,
leaving the negotiated outcome to reflect a diluted compromise or entail
provisions negotiated to the lowest common denominator. This would be an
equally counterproductive outcome and would only weaken the existing
antitrust regimes. 141
The trade and antitrust realms are also characterized by very different
negotiation dynamics. Trade negotiations taking place in the WTO framework
depend on national trade negotiators seeking to maximize the export
134 Epstein, supra note 79, at 345.
135 Tarullo, supra note 90, at 489.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 479, 489, 493-94. International convergence efforts should strive to supplement, not
replace, cooperation based on bilateral agreements. Id. at 500-01.
139 Id. at 490.
140 Id.
141 Piilola, supra note 96, at 315-16.
STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
opportunities of their domestic industries. 142 The "winner-take-all dynamic"
that characterizes antitrust disputes, however, would seriously differ from these
established negotiation practices.143 The formation of issue linkages and
attempts to offer transfer payments and negotiate concessions are common to
trade negotiations. This culture of political bargaining, however, is at odds
with the decisionmaking practices employed in the field of antitrust. The trade
law tradition of political intervention, including the use of threats of retaliation,
is in sharp conflict with the very nature of the rule-oriented law of antitrust. 144
Bringing antitrust law within the realm of trade negotiations could therefore
lead to the politicization of antitrust issues and impede achieving the desired
goals and initial purposes of an international antitrust regime.
This is not to suggest that the institutional design and adopted practices of
the organization could not be modified. New negotiation mechanisms could be
created, and the WTO's trade expertise could be supplemented by
administrators with specialized knowledge and experience in antitrust issues.
If negotiations on international antitrust laws were to take place within the
WTO, institutional changes would be required anyway to prevent the WTO
from becoming overburdened and unproductive. 145 However, the challenges
of any institutional transformation should not be underestimated. Institutional
transformation would not only involve the reform of rules and procedures, but
also call for a fundamental change in the way of thinking about and facilitating
the goals of the organization.
In addition to the above, the WTO and other international institutions
increasingly struggle with problems of legitimacy. Critics believe that the
organization is drifting away from the preferences of civil society to establish a
supranational, nondemocratic, and influential elite of its own. 146 The negative
side effects of globalization and the unequal distribution of the gains of free
trade continue to garner more and more public attention. Under these
circumstances, adding antitrust to the WTO repertoire could risk aggravating
the organization's already existing legitimacy problems.
142 Tarullo, supra note 90, at 488.
143 Epstein, supra note 79, at 362. Antitrust laws are rule-oriented, and the disputes concerning
antitrust matters are solved on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the national legal process. As part
of this process, antitrust violation is either found to exist or not. There is no scope for the "give and take
diplomacy," bargaining, or "linking" of one antitrust procedure with another, unrelated dispute in order to
reach a politically acceptable compromise. The winner in the antitrust dispute has no obligation to make
concessions in connection with another dispute, whereas trade disputes often involve elements of
bargaining, political maneuver, and the giving of concessions in exchange for victories. Id
144 Youri Devuyst, Transatlantic Competition Relations: A New World Order?, in TRANSATLANTIC
GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 127, 149-150 (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer eds.,
2001).
145 See Guzman, Antitrust and International Regulatory Federalism, supra note 124, at 1161.
146 For discussions of the events in Seattle and their implications, see generally SEATTLE, THE
WTO, AND THE FUTURE OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM (Roger B. Porter & Pierre Sauv6 eds.,
2000); JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, THE WTO AFTER SEATTLE (2000); Pierre Sauv6 & Arvind Subramanian,
Dark Clouds Over Geneva? The Troubled Prospects of the Multilateral Trading System, in EFFICIENCY,
EQUITY, LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 16 (Roger B. Porter
et al. eds., 2001).
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B. The Capacity and the Desirability of the OECD to Foster International
Convergence in Antitrust Law
The OECD has been instrumental in fostering international cooperation
and convergence in antitrust law and policy. The organization undertakes
extensive research on the internationalization of antitrust law, organizes
conferences, and coordinates international cooperation. The OECD has also
issued recommendations for enhancing international cooperation on antitrust
matters. The Recommendation Concerning Cooperation Between Member
Countries on Anti-Competitive Practices Affecting International Trade was
adopted in 1967 and amended in 1973, 1979, 1986, and 1995 (the "OECD
Recommendation").147 The original OECD Recommendation laid down
procedures for notification and international consultation and established the
norm of negative comity. Later versions adopted the concept of positive
comity and elaborated provisions on notification, consultation, investigative
assistance, and information exchange. 148
The OECD Competition Committee (the "Competition Committee")149 has
had a central role in facilitating contacts and achieving greater cooperation and
convergence among national regulators.150 The Competition Committee
consists of representatives of national antitrust enforcement agencies and
serves as a principal international forum for the exchange of views on antitrust
policy issues. 151 Under the auspices of the OECD, this body is a form of
intergovernmental, institutionalized governance. However, the operation of
the Competition Committee in practice is more reminiscent of a
transgovernmental network of national antitrust authorities.
The discussions among the Competition Committee members lay a
foundation for greater convergence in the analysis of antitrust issues and
facilitate practical cooperation among the national antitrust enforcers.152 In
this way, the Competition Committee is an example of the regulatory
convergence approach to the governance of international antitrust law and
policy. 53 It is important to note that participants understand convergence as
147 Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Co-operation Between Member
Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C(95)130/Final (July
28, 1995).
148 Id. See also earlier recommendations: OECD Doc. C(86)44/Final (May 21,1986); OECD
Doc. C(79)154/Final (Sept. 25, 1979); OECD Doc. C(73)99/Final (July 3, 1973); OECD Doc.
C(567)53/Final (Oct. 5, 1967). "Negative comity" refers to the obligation of a government to take into
consideration the interests of other governments when enforcing its national antitrust laws. See Portnoy,
supra note 75, at 167. "Positive comity" goes a step further by establishing a principle of enduring
cooperation between antitrust authorities. See Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 18, at
190. "Positive comity" also enables the party affected by anticompetitive conduct to request the other
party to take action in the case. See Devuyst, supra note 144, at 135-36.
149 The Competition Committee was known as a "Competition Law and Policy Committee" until
January 1, 2002.
150 For additional information, refer to the OECD website at http://www.oecd.org.
151 See Tarullo, supra note 90, at 490.
152 Id. at 495.
153 "Regulatory convergence" refers to a system of structured international activities that facilitate
the congruence of national laws and regulations, or coordinate their enforcement.
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referring to "de facto consistency" rather than to uniformity or
harmonization.154 In other words, national differences are legitimate and do
not necessarily contradict the idea of convergence. Less attention is given to
strict uniformity in law and institutions, and more emphasis is placed on
similarity in underlying principles, policy objectives, and enforcement
practices. 55
The Competition Committee has also produced nonbinding
recommendations including, remarkably, a 1995 recommendation on
international cooperation between competition authorities' 56 and a 1998
recommendation on the prohibition of hard-core cartels. 57
The convergence efforts of the Competition Committee rely on voluntary
cooperation between national antitrust authorities, not on any binding
instrument. The "soft law" character of the recommendations has raised
doubts about the efficacy of the provisions they provide. However, despite
their nonbinding nature, the recommendations have unquestionably facilitated
international consensus on antitrust rules and served as a model for such
bilateral cooperation agreements as those between the European Union and
United States and between Australia and New Zealand. 15
8
1. Advantages of Incorporating Antitrust into the OECD Framework
The OECD has provided a successful framework for international
cooperation by bringing together antitrust communities from several
jurisdictions. The organization's reliance on voluntary cooperation and
convergence enables deliberation on important antitrust concerns without
triggering apprehensions of losing national sovereignty. The development of
common approaches within the OECD framework is relatively smooth owing
to a rather homogeneous membership with similar economies and antitrust
traditions.
The OECD has the advantage of gathering under its auspices significant
intellectual capacity to research and analyze many aspects of international
economic law and policy. Thus, it can consider the interdependencies among
different policy realms and facilitate coherence. Specifically, the Competition
Committee's expertise and its ability to call on other OECD committees and
working groups also put the organization as a whole in a unique position to
assess antitrust problems following changes in economic environment. 59
154 Interim Report on Convergence of Competition Policies, Working Paper No. 79, OECD Doc.
OECD/GD(94)64 (1994).
155 Portnoy, supra note 75, at 89-91.
156 Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Co-operation Between Member
Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade, supra note 147.
157 See Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels,
supra note 81. The Recommendation attempts to facilitate international cooperation on "naked cartels"
that fix prices, establish quotas, restrict output, allocate markets, or make rigged bids. Id.
158 Portnoy, supra note 75, at 169 (discussing Diane Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real
International Antitrust, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 227, 289 (1992)).
159 Tarullo, supra note 90, at 502. The OECD has also established a Joint Group of Trade and
Competition ("Joint Group"). The Joint Group brings together government representatives of the trade
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2. Disadvantages of Incorporating Antitrust into the OECD Framework
The promise of the OECD's regulatory convergence approach is, however,
limited. Some shortcomings arise from the cumbersome organizational
structure of the OECD. The organization consists of relatively autonomous,
policy-specific forums for discussion and cooperation. This successfully
serves the goal of fostering institutional linkages among national regulators
and policymakers in each policy realm. Notwithstanding, the OECD remains a
weak and fragmented organization, as no single ministry within member states
has responsibility for the organization. 160 Furthermore, the national authorities
have always viewed the OECD as more of a forum for discussion than for
decisionmaking.161 This view has given the organization a second-class status
in the international arena. The recent expansions in membership have opened
new possibilities in policymaking as the OECD can no longer be seen simply
as a club of like-minded, influential, economically developed democracies.
Still, the OECD has been unable to formulate a coherent new role for itself.162
Today, the OECD's membership is too limited for it to host a truly
international antitrust agreement. Even though the limited membership
alleviates the problems involved in reaching a common approach, an
international agreement within the OECD would only solve frictions among a
select group of developed countries. Even if developing countries would later
be invited to join, the agreement would not adequately reflect their interests.
The involvement of the developing countries from the outset would lead to an
international antitrust regime reflecting the interests of developing nations in a
more acceptable manner.
163
C. The Establishment of an Independent Antitrust Institution
Eleanor Fox has argued that trade-related antitrust issues, such as private
market access restraints, should be negotiated within the WTO, whereas other
antitrust issues should be addressed in an independent forum outside its
scope. 164 Fox proposes the establishment of an independent international
antitrust institution that would focus exclusively on international antitrust
negotiations. 165
The proposal for a free-standing "World Competition Forum" stems from
the belief that an international institutional framework for international
antitrust matters is needed and that none of the existing institutions provides an
adequate framework.166 The WTO is bound by its focus on trade: It lacks the
and antitrust communities to examine issues at the nexus of trade and competition policy and thus fosters
coherent policymaking in both realms.
160 Id. at 494-95.
161 Id at 498.
162 Id. at 494-95, 498.
163 Piilola, supra note 96, at 319.
164 Fox, Competition Law, supra note 132, at 666, 674-75.
165 Id. at 674-78.
166 Id. at 677.
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expertise and decisionmaking structures designed to host an antitrust
agreement. Similarly, the OECD's membership is too limited for it to facilitate
a truly international agreement. Despite the apparent interdependence among
antitrust and other policy areas, antitrust should be treated in its own right.
This exclusive treatment is required for the development of sound rules and
principles. 167
However, establishing a new international organization does present
significant challenges. First, it would be costly and add to an already extensive
bureaucratic network. Moreover, as Fox accepts, proliferation of a new
international organization cannot be a goal as such, 168 unless an institutional
setting is needed and there is no existing institution that could incorporate a
new policy area into its existing framework. The creation of a specialized
organization focusing exclusively on antitrust matters would also limit the
opportunities for cross-issue learning and lead to incoherent and fragmented
policymaking.169
V. TRANSGOVERNMENTAL GOVERNANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST LAW
Attempts to harmonize antitrust law at the international level have, for the
most part, failed. However, national regulators have responded to the need for
increased cooperation by forming direct contacts with their counterparts in
other jurisdictions.170 The rise of these networks among antitrust authorities
has established a form of transgovernmental antitrust governance that provides
a "fast, flexible and effective" means of cooperation among antitrust
regulators.'71 Direct contacts among antitrust authorities enhance the ability of
states to work together and to coordinate their antitrust laws and policies
without the centralized bureaucracy and burdensome procedures of formal
international institutions. This cooperation is an ideal example of an informal
international rulemaking process that engages national officials directly. 72
Cooperative arrangements among antitrust authorities are often superior
solutions to initiating a WTO action. The problem of regulating international
cartels, for example, lies in the difficulty of obtaining evidence located in a
foreign jurisdiction. This difficulty is more directly overcome by establishing
cooperation mechanisms among national antitrust authorities than by bringing
the matter to an organization that does not specifically deal with the
enforcement of international cartels.173
167 Id
168 Id.
169 See Tarullo, supra note 90, at 503.
170 See Devuyst, supra note 144 (discussing the rationale and instruments of international
cooperation).
171 Slaughter, The Real New World Order supra note 18, at 193.
172 Slaughter, Governing, supra note 10, at 189.
173 Tarullo, supra note 90, at 491.
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I will focus on two aspects of regulatory cooperation among the networks
of national antitrust authorities. First, I will explore the cooperation that takes
place between antitrust authorities in developed antitrust regimes with
relatively similar regulatory laws and cultures. This analysis will focus on the
transatlantic cooperation between the European Union and the United States,
which is based on a bilateral agreement. Second, I will discuss cooperation
between antitrust authorities from developed market economies and those from
developing countries or emerging market economies that are in the process of
adopting antitrust regimes. In the latter case, cooperation faces very different
challenges by reason of the inequality of knowledge, experience, resources,
and the differences in the economic environments in which the regulators
operate.
A. Bilateral Agreements among Similar Antitrust Regimes
Bilateral agreements create a framework for consultation and cooperation
among national antitrust agencies. The agreements are often established among
similar antitrust regimes--a fact that makes negotiation and implementation
significantly less problematic than if they were established at the international
level among nations with divergent regimes.
Several reasons lead countries to enter into bilateral cooperation
arrangements. First, cooperation is designed to avoid problems arising from
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Second, cooperation facilitates the
investigation and enforcement of international antitrust cases by providing
access to essential evidence. The evidence needed for taking a remedial action
is often located beyond the reach of the national antitrust enforcement officials
and can only be obtained with the help of foreign authorities. Third, effective
cooperation can prevent conflicts in reaching conclusions and assessing
remedies. Finally, through cooperation and coordination, unnecessary
duplication of work can be avoided, saving transaction costs.174
The preconditions laid out above for the efficient functioning of
transgovernmental networks can be verified when explored in the antitrust
realm. The common perception is that policy coordination can take place
among agencies composed of experts enjoying considerable autonomy in
hierarchically superior government structures. 175 The similarity of regulatory
goals and institutional structures of cooperating agencies further facilitates
coordination. The demonstrated success of the cooperation between E.U. and
U.S. antitrust agencies can be explained in large part by the relative
independence of the agencies, as well as the similarity of their policy agendas
and preferences over a wide range of antitrust issues.176 "Shared substantive
beliefs about markets, law, and regulation facilitate collective action." 177
174 Devuyst, supra note 144, at 132.
175 See Pollack & Shaffer, Who Governs?, supra note 3, at 303.
176 Id. at 292,303.
177 Portnoy, supra note 75, at 170.
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The downside of bilateral agreements is that they are inadequate in
promoting coherence among different, interdependent policy fields. As
discussed above, one of the most appealing arguments for international
antitrust rules has been the recognized linkages between antitrust and trade
policies. By relying exclusively on bilateral cooperation mechanisms,
coherence in antitrust and trade policies is not adequately advanced. The
antitrust authorities cooperating in this bilateral framework may not focus on
the broader goals of globalization and trade liberalization when pursuing
cooperation in individual cases. Transgovernmental antitrust networks thus
pose a danger of pursuing policy outcomes that conflict with trade concerns.
However, this problem of incoherence could be overcome by establishing a
dialogue with regulators and policymakers specializing in trade issues.
Finally, bilateral agreements generally do not provide for antitrust
authorities to exchange confidential business information, which is essential
for effective interagency cooperation. However, confidential information can
be exchanged if a party or parties under investigation explicitly permit
authorities to do so. 178 This is more likely to occur in merger cases where the
merging parties may benefit from a speedy review process. In contrast, parties
in cartel cases have nothing to gain from a sound investigation and are often
reluctant to aid antitrust authorities in their investigation. Governments have
recognized the importance of exchanging confidential information for effective
cooperation on antitrust matters. When the U.S. Congress, for example, passed
the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act in 1994,179 the Act
authorized the U.S. Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the U.S.
Department of Justice ("DOJ") to enter into antitrust assistance agreements
with their foreign counterparts with the purpose of sharing confidential
information.180 The authorization outlines strict conditions of confidentiality
and reciprocity, which set the limits on the exchange of confidential
information. 181 Thus far, an agreement based on the Act has only been signed
with Australia, in 1999.
B. Bilateral Agreement between the European Union and United States
E.U.-U.S. antitrust relations are characterized by a culture of genuine
regulatory cooperation with sincere efforts to address common goals and
shared concerns. The daily interaction between the authorities has led to
increasingly cooperative attitudes among antitrust enforcers on both sides of
the Atlantic. Instead of being guardians of the interests of their national
industries, the antitrust enforcers have come to redefine their roles as members
of a transatlantic antitrust community who share common concerns with their
178 See Devuyst, supra note 144, at 148 ("In the Microsoft case of 1994, for instance, the company
consented to an exchange of confidential information [between the E.U. and U.S. antitrust agencies], thus
enabling the two competition authorities to jointly negotiate a settlement with Microsoft.").
179 International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. § 46 (2002). Note that
mergers fall outside the scope of the agreement.
180 Devuyst, supra note 144, at 132.
181 Id.
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professional counterparts. 82 This cooperation has been an ideal example of a
new form of "fast, flexible and effective governance" by transgovemmental
networks. 183
A bilateral agreement between the European Union and the United States
was signed in 1991 (the "1991 Agreement").1 84 The 1991 Agreement contains
provisions on notification, exchange of nonconfidential information, and
coordination of enforcement activities and possible remedies.185  The
agreement generates a presumption that antitrust authorities of one country
may request the authorities in another country to investigate and, when
necessary, remedy anticompetitive conduct according to their antitrust laws.186
Between 1991 and 1999, the E.U. and U.S. antitrust agencies cooperated in
689 cases of mutual interest. 187  The cooperation has facilitated antitrust
enforcement in cases of mutual interest and has often led to the adoption of a
common approach. For instance, the E.U. and U.S. antitrust authorities jointly
and successfully investigated the Microsoft case in 1994. The FTC, the DOJ,
and the European Commission coordinated their positions, investigations, and
remedies. Microsoft itself facilitated investigations by granting the agencies
permission to share confidential information. The investigations led to joint
settlement negotiations and nearly identical remedies. 188
Another high-profile case leading to tensions between the U.S. and E.U.
antitrust communities was the merger between Boeing. and McDonnell
Douglas. 89 After the FTC had cleared the proposed merger, the European
Commission threatened to block the transaction. The FTC and the European
Commission then consulted each other, and the Commission accommodated
U.S. concerns by agreeing to limit the scope of its action. 190 After the merging
182 Id at 127-28.
183 See Slaughter, Governing, supra note 10, at 193-94 (discussing implications and problems of
regulating the global economy through government networks).
184 E.U.-U.S. Agreement on Competition Law, supra note 100.
185 Devuyst,.supra note 144, at 135. Confidential information may only be exchanged if the
corporations under investigation grant a waiver. Id. In addition, the 1991 Agreement also established
provisions on negative and positive comity. The principle of positive comity was reinforced in the
Decision of the Council and Commission 98/386/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 173) 26.
186 Portnoy, supra note 75, at 176.
187 Devuyst, supra note 144, at 138. A total of 473 cases of cooperation concerned transatlantic
mergers. Strategic alliances and monopolization resulted in cooperation in 216 cases. The figures
illustrate that the cooperation is based on well-balanced mutual notification practice. The European
Commission notified the United States in 358 cases, whereas the notifications by the United States were
almost as frequent, numbering 331. Id
188 The U.S. and the E.U. authorities carried out a first ever joint investigation, arriving at a
coordinated remedy. See Anne K. Bingman, Speech Before the American Law Institute 72nd Annual
Meeting (May 16, 1996), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/96-05-16.htm (discussing cooper-
ation by enforcement in international antitrust matters).
189 Commission Decision 97/816/EC of 30 July 1997 Declaring a Concentration Compatible with
the Common Market and the Functioning of the ECA Agreement, Case IViM.877, Boeing/McDonnell
Douglas, 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16 [hereinafter Commission Decision of 30 July 1997].
190 Thomas Lampert, International Cooperation among Competition Authorities, 20 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 214, 218-19 (1999).
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parties had consented to the Commission's requirements, the European Union
also cleared the merger. 19'
Only rarely have the agencies reached a conflicting final assessment.192
This happened recently when the proposed GE/Honeywell merger was
approved by U.S. antitrust authorities but blocked by the European
Commission.193 According to some, the transatlantic divergence suggested
significant substantive and economic differences between the E.U. and U.S.
merger regimes.194  Others emphasize that divergent appraisals, though
possible, are exceptional.195  Each antitrust authority performs its own
assessment and sometimes reaches unique conclusions despite genuine efforts
to cooperate and coordinate investigations. However, such outcomes are rare,
and therefore the GE/Honeywell decision hardly marks a new era of
disagreements. 196
C. Cooperation between Developed and Emerging Antitrust Agencies
Close to one hundred member countries in the WTO have no antitrust
regimes. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European
Union, and the United States in particular have eagerly encouraged those
countries to adopt antitrust laws. In addition, the European Union and the
United States have enthusiastically exported their respective antitrust models
and offered advice and technical assistance.
The assistance provided to developing countries and emerging economies
in their efforts to establish antitrust regimes is of remarkable significance.
Antitrust policy plays an important role for developing countries in their
transition to market-based economies. The adoption of antitrust laws and the
establishment of enforcement agencies serve broader economic goals and
strengthen market structures in the countries concerned. Competitive markets
do not emerge merely through deregulation of some key industries. Instead,
competitive markets must be constructed and maintained through
institutionalized antitrust rules and principles. 197
Technical assistance in the antitrust domain originates from U.N.
initiatives. 198 Since the 1980s, an international group of experts established
191 Commission Decision of 30 July 1997, supra note 189; see also Press Release, European
Commission, The Commission Clears the Merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas under
Conditions and Obligations, IP/97/729 (July 30, 1997).
192 See Devuyst, supra note 144, at 127.
193 Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 91 (declaring concentration to be
incompatible with the common market).
194 Donna E. Patterson & Carl Shapiro, Trans-Atlantic Divergence in GE/Honeywell Causes and
Lessons, 16 ANTITRUST 18, 18 (2001), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/divergence.
pdf.
195 See, e.g., Alexander Schaub, The Direction of Competition Policy: Reconciling National and
International Objectives, Address at the Annual Fall Conference on Competition Law, Ottawa 9 (Sept. 21,
2001), http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp200l 033 en.pdf.
196 Id.
197 Portnoy, supra note 73, at 107-08.
198 Id. at 111, 118-19.
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under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development has encouraged developing countries to adopt national antitrust
laws. The group has assisted in drafting legislation and training antitrust
officials. In the 1990s, technical assistance was increasingly provided by
antitrust agencies from the United States and the European Union and by the
experts of the OECD. For instance, the OECD has established an "Outreach
Program" that assists developing countries with broad-based regulatory
reform. As part of the program, representatives from developing countries
attend meetings of the OECD Competition Committee. In addition, developing
countries receive assistance in drafting legislation, building institutions,
training officials, and implementing and enforcing their antitrust policies.
However, some raise concerns that the eagerness of the developed antitrust
regimes to offer antitrust expertise stems from self-interest. The assistance can
be seen as an opportunity for the powerful countries to exercise "regulatory
imperialism" and impose policy preferences on less powerful states. 99 It is
true that superior expertise and resources of developed antitrust nations give
them power to incorporate their own policy objectives in antitrust laws they
help establish in developing countries. Nonetheless, it is in the interest of both
developed and developing nations to create stable and efficient antitrust
regimes all over the world. This is not always achieved by simply replicating
the antitrust provisions and preferences of developed nations.
VI. TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW
Intergovernmental and transgovernmental models of global governance
fail to include multinational corporations, consumers, and other nonstate actors
in the construction of an international antitrust framework. At best, the
intergovernmental model of governance views private actors as "domestic
interests," constraining the margin of maneuverability available to the
representatives of government in intergovernmental bargaining forums. 200 The
limited involvement by societal actors in global governance is consistent with a
traditional state-centered view of international order.
However, antitrust policy, located at the intersection of the public and
private spheres, can benefit immensely from the increased involvement of the
private sector in setting the regulatory agenda. In various fields, increased
blurring of the line dividing private and public spheres and the growing
involvement by private actors in governance have relocated public governance
functions from states to transnational private actors.2 01 This has led to the
development of a new private institutional order demanding a stronger public-
private partnership in domestic and international governance. With this
199 See discussion supra Part II.E.2.
200 Maria G. Cowles, The Transatlantic Business Dialogue: Transforming the New Transatlantic
Dialogue, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 213, 215 (Mark A. Pollack &
Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001).
201 Saskia Sassen, What's Wrong with International Law Scholarship?: The State and Economic
Globalization: Any Implications for International Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 109, 110 (2000).
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scenario in mind, creating a true public-private partnership to enhance
international cooperation on antitrust would have many advantages.
Governments sometimes overlook market failures that occur when the
economic environment changes. Because firms bear the costs of regulation,
they can provide valuable information on the effects of different regulatory
approaches on their business. Multinational companies are often ahead of
governments in thinking about trade liberalization and the effects of market
integration. They benefit from a truly open, international marketplace and a
sound regulatory framework. The corporations operating in global markets
therefore have the ability to look beyond national interests and think
globally.202
How could civil society contribute to the dialogue on international antitrust
law? The Transatlantic Business Dialogue ("TABD" or "Dialogue") offers a
helpful framework. Although the TABD focuses on E.U.-U.S. business
relations in general and has not focused in particular on antitrust issues, its
success in other areas suggests a potential to contribute to discussions on an
appropriate transnational governance model for antitrust.
Returning to the three-model taxonomy of global governance-
intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and transnational-the TABD does not
fit perfectly into any of these categories. It is best conceptualized as a form of
transnational governance even though it is not a typical transnational pressure
group focusing on activities independent of the state.203 The participating
corporations of the TABD work closely with government officials to help them
create solutions for potential regulatory disputes. The TABD's contribution to
the negotiating and signing of the E.U.-U.S. Agreement on Competition Law is
an illustrative example of where cooperation between industry and government
can lead.204 At the same time, the TABD has not only provided a setting for
E.U. and U.S. officials to discuss issues of common interest, but it has also
successfully shaped and facilitated the transatlantic dialogue and fostered a
participatory process of regulatory cooperation. 205 Thus, some have argued
that the greatest instructive value of the TABD is in the suggestion of the
effectiveness of a "bottom-up, pragmatic" approach to formulating
regulation. 206
However, the range of private actors engaged in governance should not
encompass only large corporations, which often possess superior capacities
and greater resources to pressure political decisionmakers and get involved in
drafting regulatory agendas. For example, the failed WTO meeting in Seattle
provided a stark illustration of this principle by conveying the public's
202 Cowles, supra note 200, at 213-14, 218.
203 Id. at 214.
204 E.U.-U.S. Agreement on Competition Law, supra note 100; see also Cowles, supra note 200, at
215 (noting that progress in the negotiations on the Mutual Recognition Agreement was made only after
chief executives of E.U. and U.S. corporations took the initiative).
205 Cowles, supra note 200, at 213-14.
206 Id. at 226.
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concerns over the undue influence of large corporations in international trade
matters. 207
To balance the influence of the business community in designing
regulatory frameworks and international antitrust regimes, transnational
governance should also involve active participation by consumer
organizations. In the transatlantic setting, for example, the Transatlantic
Consumer Dialogue ("TACD") was established in response to concerns that,
through the TABD, business interests were disproportionately influencing
bilateral trade talks to the detriment of consumers.
2 08
The influence of civil society groups depends on at least two factors. First,
different civil society groups are equipped with very different resources and
thus have unequal access to the governance process. Among the existing
transatlantic dialogues, for example, those that focus on labor, consumer, and
environmental issues have enjoyed far less success than the TABD in obtaining
policy results. The TACD has not managed to secure an equal footing with the
TABD in influencing decisionmaking, and groups such as Consumers
International have never had direct, formal access to policymakers in the
course of intergovernmental negotiations. Second, domestic institutions are
designed to accommodate or exclude certain interests. The trade policy
establishment in the United States, for example, has simply not been organized
to accommodate demands from consumers and consequently has been
significantly more responsive to the concerns of business groups than to those
of consumers. 209
Just as the success demonstrated by the inclusion of business organizations
in transatlantic policymaking could be duplicated at the global level, the
problems faced by consumer organizations are likely to be reproduced if they
seek access to global antitrust policymaking. Still, a greater role for
corporations and consumers in designing an international antitrust regime has
the potential to lead to a more efficient, fair, and legitimate regulatory
framework.
Another challenge to the incorporation of civil society into international
policymaking is the need to create a "dialogue among dialogues."
210 It is
reasonable to assume that transnational groups participate in international
policymaking to ensure that their interests are taken into account. However,
the dialogues are often segmented by sectors: Business representatives do not
meet with consumer, labor, and environmental groups to discuss common
agendas.21 While there is no need for a single overarching dialogue, different
dialogues and issue-specific networks ought to communicate with each other.
In the antitrust domain, this would entail improved interaction between the
207 Id. at 229.
208 Bignami & Charnovitz, supra note 49, at 261-62. Consumers International, an organization
with members in both the United States and European Union, was chosen to lead the effort. Consumers
International has 260 member organizations in 110 countries and is considered the "principal player in the
realm of international consumer affairs." Id. at 264.
209 Id. at 258-59, 268-69, 278.
210 See generally id. (discussing the importance of an open dialogue in a single public sphere).
211 Pollack & Shaffer, Who Governs?, supra note 3, at 300, 303-04.
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business community and consumer organizations. This interaction could
potentially shape the agendas and preferences of each group and lead to
increased and beneficial cross-fertilization and mutual understanding. 212
VII. CONCLUSIONS ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE DRAWN FROM THE CASE
STUDY OF ANTITRUST LAW
A. The Insufficiency and Impropriety of Relying Solely
on Intergovernmental Antitrust Governance
From the notion that current international antitrust law is characterized by
coexisting diversity and convergence comes a critical question: When do we
tolerate diversity and when should we strive for convergence? In other words,
which differences among national antitrust laws have to be reconciled and
which ones can be left to national economic sovereignty? 213 A certain amount
of divergence in national antitrust regimes encourages innovation and
experimentation while preventing stagnation. Only those differences that
hinder the efficient functioning of the international economic order should be
the target of convergence efforts. Thus, individual countries should have
substantial leeway to design their own antitrust laws, policies, and practices.
Managing differences among various antitrust regimes should be as important
a goal as facilitating convergence.
The international antitrust debate is presently focused on intergovern-
mental efforts to enhance cooperation and foster convergence. In particular, it
is centered on whether or not international antitrust rules ought to be
incorporated into the WTO framework. 214 Thus far, concrete proposals for an
international antitrust regime have envisioned the regime as a full-fledged
global institution with substantive antitrust provisions. The greatest obstacle
for politically realistic solutions has been the all-or-nothing position taken by
many participants in the international antitrust debate. Comprehensive global
solutions often turn out to be too broad and too inflexible. They threaten a loss
of sovereignty, which generates the fear that international integration prevents
governments from delivering preferred benefits to their citizens. 215
At least for today, it is neither possible nor desirable to construct an
agreement on antitrust law at the international level. National antitrust regimes
differ so widely that there is no common ground upon which to build an
agreement. 216 An international agreement on specific antitrust rules would
likely include only a very narrow core set of rules reflecting shared preferences
across nations. Such an agreement would only proscribe some of the most
212 Bignami & Chamovitz, supra note 49, at 281.
213 The essential task of the international network is to define the differences that have the potential
to hinder the efficient functioning of global markets and international trade.
214 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
215 Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism, supra note 1, at 1801.
216 Portnoy, supra note 75, at 26.
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hard-core antitrust offenses, such as price-fixing and market allocation.
Meanwhile, vertical restraints and the abuse of market dominance are two
areas where substantive differences remain strong.217
Countries have different ideas of what competition means and interpret
market conduct in light of their own distinct economic traditions. Only about
half of the WTO member states have incorporated antitrust laws into their
domestic legal regimes, and, of those countries that have, many have done so
only recently. An international antitrust code imposed upon inexperienced
regimes lacking traditions of antitrust enforcement can easily lead to
counterproductive market outcomes. For its part, the WTO, the most widely
discussed institutional alternative for providing antitrust regulation, lacks the
capacity to provide an adequate institutional framework. The inclusion of
antitrust into the WTO's agenda would likely lead to subordinating antitrust
law to trade policy concerns, which could be more detrimental than beneficial
from the point of view of competition.
B. The Desirability ofDeveloping Transgovernmental Antitrust Governance
Rather than drafting overarching multilateral agreements on antitrust laws,
cooperation efforts in the immediate future are more likely to succeed in
managing existing diversity and promoting voluntary convergence based on
approximation of domestically applied standards. Networks of antitrust
authorities are well-suited to facilitate this process of cooperation and
voluntary convergence. They provide a setting for cross-fertilization and foster
common understanding. Voluntary codes of conduct, nonbinding recommend-
ations, and informal agreements on cooperation among national antitrust
agencies further a common regulatory approach. The reliance on soft law as a
tool to harmonize antitrust regimes allows for policy experimentation and
permits flexibility and adaptability of law to local circumstances. 218
Furthermore, mutual trust evolves among regulators as a result of
increased contacts and forms a basis for future harmonization efforts. If more
formal cooperation becomes necessary, the negotiations will run more
smoothly due to an existing degree of convergence and history of mutual trust.
Consequently, it is desirable for countries to continue to negotiate bilateral
agreements, including provisions on information-sharing and positive comity.
New bilateral agreements lay the foundation for an international antitrust
agreement and prepare countries for more sophisticated international
cooperation.219
By comparison, hard rules and associated sanctions often cause hesitancy
and decrease the likelihood of an agreement. The prospect of binding rules
changes the dynamics of negotiations. Negotiators are more conscious of their
national interests and bargain every detail carefully. Exceptions are often
217 Tarullo, supra note 90, at 490.
218 Portnoy, supra note 75, at 29, 204.
219 Tarullo, supra note 90, at 500-01.
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introduced to ensure that the country does not bind itself to something contrary
to its sovereign interests.
To illustrate this distinction, the current international antitrust regime is
becoming increasingly cooperative. States are relying on soft law and
developing informal, voluntary measures to manage conflicts arising from
incompatible national antitrust policies. The preferred process of developing
an international approach to antitrust is based on the deliberation and building
of an antitrust culture rather than on coercion.220 Increased contacts, meetings,
and workshops among antitrust officials, scholars, and practitioners, as well as
the increase of technical assistance by developed antitrust nations to
developing ones, have bridged gulfs in economic thinking and provided a
setting for common understanding. 221 Increased cooperation among
participants in the antitrust network has shaped, and continues to shape, their
respective perceptions on the common regulatory agenda, gradually leading to
shared understandings and common practices. A consensus on the centrality of
competition is steadily developing among antitrust regulators across
jurisdictions. 222 Thus, convergence among national antitrust regimes and
cooperation among antitrust authorities are mutually reinforcing.
The most compelling argument against the mere reliance on bilateral
cooperation is that globally optimal solutions require there to be at least some
players who are charged with the responsibility of enhancing the welfare of the
world at large. 223 In other words, mere cooperation among national antitrust
authorities does not produce a globally optimal antitrust regime. Instead, some
supranational standard or authority is required. Though any far-reaching
international antitrust regime is at present unworkable, some form of
international coordination of the various bilateral arrangements may be
beneficial and serve the goal of achieving broad regulatory consistency.
The existing bilateral agreements could, for example, be supplemented by
voluntary multilateral cooperation agreements in the OECD setting.
Alternatively, the potential of the recently established International
Competition Network to develop its role and take a greater responsibility in
harmonizing national antitrust laws is worth exploring.224 The concentration
of cooperation efforts in a single forum could contribute to coordinated
analysis and joint action in cases involving, not just two, but multiple markets.
By way of illustration, one concrete task for the OECD Competition
Committee would be to harmonize premerger notification procedures. 225 The
variations in the kind of information that must be provided to each antitrust
220 Portnoy, supra note 75, at 7, 196.
221 Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism, supra note 1, at 1787.
222 As an example, internationalization of the so-called "Chicago School" of antitrust has been
remarkable. European antitrust authorities are increasingly adopting the teachings of the Chicago School
and its emphasis on the efficiency justification. See Portnoy, supra note 75, at 196.
223 Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism, supra note 71, at 1801.
224 For additional information, refer to The International Competition Network website, at
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org.
225 ABA Special Comm. on Int'l Antitrust, Report of the Special Committee on International
Antitrust 19 (1991).
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agency could be minimized to reduce the unnecessary burden that occurs when
a merger has to be filed in several jurisdictions simultaneously. Time frames
for premerger reviews could also be homogenized. The differences in timing
and the content of notifications do not represent genuine policy choices by
sovereigns and should thus be easy to overcome. The harmonized notification
processes would not only reduce the burden faced by merging parties, but also
enable antitrust authorities to better coordinate their investigations. This
scheme would ensure that all agencies receive the same information
simultaneously and allow them to initiate their consultative mechanism and to
coordinate investigation. Duplicative enforcement efforts and undue delays in
the approval process could be avoided and remedial measures coordinated. 226
Furthermore, the membership of the sophisticated OECD Competition
Committee should also be opened to countries that are not OECD member
states. Any country with existing antitrust law and enforcement should be
invited to participate in transgovernmental cooperation and dialogue.
Countries without established antitrust regimes should also be included as
observers in the Competition Committee's activities. 227 This would ensure not
only convergence among a selected club, but also adequate protection of the
interests of the emerging antitrust regimes.
C. The Essential Supplementary Role of Transnational Antitrust Governance
Participation of different transnational actors in global governance ought to
supplement rather than replace strong political leadership. They can
complement efforts to foster cooperation and achieve increased convergence
through intergovernmental and transgovernmental fora. Ideally, the
international antitrust architecture would be designed through active, open,
transparent, and cooperative dialogue in which all levels of governance
participate.
One of the ways to generate broad public support for the international free
trade agenda is to increase the involvement of civil society in the
policymaking. The involvement of civil society leads to more desirable,
transparent, and legitimate antitrust policymaking at the international level.
Consequently, the business community and consumer organizations ought to
be more engaged in shaping the regulatory framework. The potential of a
partnership between business and government in setting regulatory agendas
should be exploited for the benefit of both those who regulate and those who
are regulated. Corporations should not just assume the role of influencing
regulatory agendas by lobbying their respective governments. They ought to
be involved in discussing, proposing, and recommending policy preferences
side-by-side with state and substate actors. 228 At the same time, the role of
226 Tarullo, supra note 90, at 502.
227 Id. at 503.
228 Cowles, supra note 200, at 221-25 (discussing the "durability and importance of the business
dialogue").
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corporations ought to be balanced by engaging consumer organizations, as
discussed above.
VIII. CONCLUSION
All three models of global governance have a place in international
antitrust law and thus in international policymaking generally. Ideally, the
intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and transnational models of governance
complement and constrain one another and contribute to an optimally balanced
global governance regime. Finding a balance between globalization and
sovereignty cannot be done by relying solely on a traditional, state-centered
understanding of global governance and ignoring the multiplicity of actors now
engaged in international policymaking. Thus, a more nuanced global
governance theory provides a more sophisticated analytical framework for
policymakers to design governing mechanisms for international policy realms.
The presumptions of the superiority of the intergovernmental model of
global governance that underlie the contemporary debate inhibit our capacity
to propose feasible alternatives for global governance. In particular, as the
above case study of international antitrust regulation illustrates, policymakers
face difficulties when they attempt to establish a binding global governance
framework under the auspices of an international institution, such as the WTO.
These unsuccessful attempts show the limitations of political bargaining and
demonstrate the need for adequate political support at the national level.
Antitrust is a prime example of a policy area where the benefits of direct
international cooperation through government networks are recognized and
realized in practice, and its example provides support for transgovernmental
governance theories. The involvement of corporations and consumer
organizations in setting regulatory agendas and influencing policy outcomes in
the antitrust domain is a rather recent phenomenon, and its effects have been
marginal. However, positive experience based on the increased participation
of these actors points to the potential of transnational governance to lead to
more inclusive, transparent, and participatory global governance.
The preceding examination of international antitrust regulation also
validates the mutually reinforcing nature of cooperation and convergence.
Increased interaction between antitrust enforcers has led to growing similarity
in national regulatory approaches. Moreover, the theoretical assumption that
cooperation often takes place between transgovernmental actors sharing
similar regulatory laws and cultures is confirmed by the extensive cooperation
between U.S. and E.U. antitrust authorities.
The antitrust case study also highlights the apprehensions raised regarding
regulatory imperialism. The debate surrounding international antitrust
regulation is dominated by traditionally influential nations such as the United
States and the European Union. In addition, the success of transgovernmental
and transnational models for governing international antitrust has
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predominantly been limited to accomplishments with respect to the regulatory
convergence between the U.S. and E.U. antitrust policies.229 Expanding the
network of international governance to embrace a more diverse range of
regimes is a challenge to which global governance theories do not provide a
sufficiently straightforward response. Governance theories must design and
develop models of governance that more effectively embrace the concerns of
the world community at large.
International institutions and intergovernmental cooperation have
established roles in international policymaking. However, relying solely on an
intergovernmental model of global governance raises concerns about coercion
and loss of sovereignty. This traditional model ought to be complemented by
more efficient and flexible transgovernmental networks while being
constrained and legitimized by the greater participation of transnational actors.
As the case study of international antitrust law demonstrates, any workable
global governance regime must incorporate aspects of all three models to avoid
the downsides of each.
Regimes created through norms of reciprocity, trust, and consensus are
superior to regimes advancing the rule of law through regulatory imperialism.
Achieving convergence by compelling nations to harmonize their policies
despite a lack of common vision can lead to unsuccessful public policies and
ineffective global governance. 230 International cooperation must be based on
mutual trust and a reciprocal commitment to commonly defined preferences.
Reliance on coercion creates fragile, vulnerable regimes, whereas reliance on
voluntary convergence lays a solid foundation on which future cooperation can
be built.231
229 On the other hand, the International Competition Network ("ICN") has grown in fifteen months
from sixteen members in fourteen jurisdictions to seventy-seven members representing sixty-seven
jurisdictions. More information regarding the lCN is available on their website, at http://www.inter
nationalcompetitionnetwork.org. See also von Finckenstein, supra note 77 (discussing the growth of
ICN). However, the cooperation within the framework of the ICN cannot be compared to the extent and
depth of cooperative efforts between the U.S. and E.U. antitrust authorities.
230 Cf Majone, International Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 34, at 130. Majone notes that
agreements often lack credibility when the level of implementation is uncertain. He rightly emphasizes
the importance of trustbuilding, but also argues that "where such mutual trust is not forthcoming,
regulatory cooperation may have to be supported by formal institutions and centralized procedures." Id.
Finding his notion that formal institutions and centralized procedures would be needed in the absence of
mutual trust problematic, I would instead argue that mutual trust is a necessary precondition for
establishment of centralized and institutionalized procedures.
231 Drezner, supra note 5, at 334.

